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 As rational agents, we are constantly faced with questions about what to do, think, and feel. 
The answers to these questions are given by the normative standards that govern our actions, thoughts, 
and feelings. But it isn’t enough that our actions, thoughts, and feelings just happen to comply with 
these standards. It is also important that the success involved in complying with these standards is 
attributable to us as agents, instead of being merely accidental. For our success to be attributable to 
us, we must not just comply with these standards, but actually be guided by them in acting, thinking, 
and feeling. This distinction, between merely complying with a standard and being guided by that 
standard, has application throughout our normative lives.  
 The aim of this dissertation is to introduce a category that I call normative achievement, and 
illustrate its connection to rational agency. A normative achievement is the positive status an action, 
thought, or feeling has when it is guided by a standard that governs it, as opposed to merely complying 
with that standard. On the account I develop, normative achievements consist in being guided by a 
standard through responsiveness to normative reasons that are connected in the right way to that 
standard. Besides sketching a general account of normative achievement, I illustrate the category by 
developing accounts of two achievements: moral worth and rationality. In doing so, I shed light on 
how achievements like moral worth and rationality are ultimately successful exercises of our rational 
agency – our capacity to discern good reasons for action, thought, and feeling, and respond to those 
reasons accordingly.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE FRAMEWORK OF NORMATIVE ACHIEVEMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
As rational agents, we are constantly faced with questions about what to do, think, and feel. 
The answers to these questions are given by the normative standards that govern our actions, thoughts, 
and feelings. Our actions can be right or wrong, virtuous or vicious; our doxastic attitudes can be 
correct or incorrect, justified or unjustified; our feelings can be fitting or unfitting, rational or irrational. 
And so on. In this way, our actions, thoughts, and feelings all share the property of being standard-
governed. Consequently, it tends to matter to us whether we comply with the relevant standards in these 
different dimensions of our lives. But it isn’t enough that our actions, thoughts, and feelings just happen 
to comply with these standards. It is important that the success involved in complying with these 
standards is attributable to us as agents, instead of being merely accidental. For our success to be 
attributable to us, we must not just comply with these standards, but actually be guided by them in 
acting, thinking, and feeling. This distinction, between merely complying with a standard and being 
guided by that standard, seems to have application throughout our normative lives.  
 The aim of this dissertation is to introduce a category that I call normative achievement, and 
illustrate its connection to rational agency. A normative achievement is the positive status an action, 
thought, or feeling has when it is guided by a standard that governs it, as opposed to merely complying 
with that standard.1 On my account, normative achievements consist in being guided by a standard 
 
1 Many philosophers have drawn distinctions explicitly in terms similar to these. Most closely to my project, Railton (2006) 
distinguishes between merely acting in accordance with a norm and being guided by that norm. Similarly, Kripke’s (1982) 
discussion of Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations distinguishes between merely acting in accordance with a rule and 




through responsiveness to normative reasons that are connected in the right way to that standard. The 
distinction between actions, thoughts, and feelings that merely comply with a standard, and those that 
are normative achievements, can be used to capture a variety of distinctions in philosophy, such as the 
distinction between merely right action and morally worthy action. Moreover, the category of 
normative achievements shows how achievements like moral worth and rationality are ultimately 
successful exercises of our rational agency – our capacity to discern good reasons for action, thought, 
and feeling, and respond to those reasons accordingly.  
 In this introductory chapter, I will provide a characterization of normative achievements, and 
lay out some of the general advantages of analyzing them in terms of normative reasons. As I will 
argue, normative reasons play a unique and irreplaceable role in explaining how normative 
achievements are really achievements in the first place – that is, instances of success that are attributable 
to us as rational agents. That normative reasons play this unique and irreplaceable role makes a strong 
case for the centrality of reasons in our normative theorizing.  
In successive chapters of this dissertation, I will turn to some more specific issues related to 
rational agency and normative achievement. In Chapter 2, I will provide an account of acting, 
believing, and feeling for motivating reasons, which is a precondition for the successful exercise of 
rational agency, and therefore for normative achievement. In Chapters 3-4, I will provide accounts of 
two normative achievements: moral worth and rationality. These accounts will serve as applications 
of the general framework of normative achievements, but also as independently plausible accounts 
that solve issues particular to moral worth and rationality, respectively. Finally, in the Chapter Five, I 
will return to the general account of normative achievement and, in light of the issues discussed in the 
middle chapters, draw further conclusions about the nature of normative achievement, including what 





2. Characterizing Normative Achievement 
 Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have been worried about cases where, for 
some normative standard, an agent seems to merely comply with a standard, but not be guided by that 
standard. For example, Aristotle distinguishes between merely acting in accordance with virtue and 
acting from virtue.2 Similarly, Kant distinguishes between merely acting in accordance with duty and 
acting from duty.3 Furthermore, the theory of knowledge from Plato onward has been deeply 
concerned with cases where someone has a correct belief, but their belief was formed in a way that 
had nothing to do with the truth of the proposition believed.4,5 In all such cases, an agent complies 
with a normative standard (virtue, rightness, correctness) in a way that lacks the right kind of 
connection to that standard. Her compliance with the relevant standard seems to be a mere accident. 
As such, the success involved in complying with that standard cannot be attributable to her; it cannot 
be an achievement on her part.  
 As rational agents, we have the capacity to be guided by the standards that govern our actions, 
thoughts, and feelings, instead of merely complying with them as a matter of happenstance. What 
must be the case for us to be guided by a standard in this way? In my view, the answer to this question 
must advert to a central (if not the central) capacity of rational agency: the capacity to act, think, and 
feel in response to the very reasons that justify our actions, thoughts, and feelings. The concept of a 
normative reason is indispensable in making sense of the distinction between merely complying with 
 
2 Nichomachean Ethics, 1105b.  
3 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:406. 
4 In Theaetetus 201c-d, Socrates says that knowledge is “true judgment with an account,” and that “true judgment without 
an account falls outside of knowledge.”  





a standard and being guided by that standard, because normative reasons are unique in being able to 
play two explanatory roles. The first role is bearing explanatory relations to the standards that govern 
our actions, thoughts, and feelings. The second role is bearing explanatory relations to those actions, 
thoughts, and feelings themselves.  
For example, consider moral reasons. Moral reasons are normative reasons that morally justify 
actions. It is commonly thought that in morally justifying actions, moral reasons play a determinative 
role in the overall moral status of actions. The justification for thinking so will be explored a bit more 
in §3 of this chapter. But briefly, the idea is this: moral reasons just are those considerations that are 
relevant to the overall moral status of actions. Whether some action is morally right or not depends 
on all of those morally relevant considerations, and what they tell us about that action. In other words, 
moral rightness is an overall moral status that is determined by the balance of moral reasons. As such, 
moral reasons bear an explanatory relation to the standard of moral rightness. Moral reasons also have 
the potential to bear an explanatory relation to our actions themselves. When our actions are motivated 
by morally relevant considerations, we act on the basis of moral reasons. In such cases, moral reasons 
bear an explanatory relation to our actions themselves. Crucially, both of these explanatory relations 
can obtain for the same action. In cases where someone does the right thing for the reasons that make 
it right, the very same moral reasons at once explain why it was the right thing to do and why she did 
it.  
Because normative reasons can bear both of these kinds of explanatory relations at once, they 
are uniquely suited to explain the difference between merely complying with a standard and being 
guided by a standard. We exercise our rational agency by acting, thinking, and feeling for reasons. And 
it is when we correctly respond to the very normative reasons that justify our actions, thoughts, and 
feelings that we exercise our rational agency successfully. And because these reasons bear explanatory 




standards in virtue of correctly responding to the reasons that bear on them, we are thereby guided by 
those standards in action, thought, and feeling. Normative achievements, in short, consist in being 
guided by a standard by correctly responding to normative reasons that bear on that standard in the 
right way.  
Here is an illustration of the structure of normative achievement: 
  
 
In this diagram, ‘φ’ stands for any standard-governed action, thought, and feeling. When the structure 
illustrated obtains, the explanatory relation between her φing and the normative reasons on the basis 
of which she φs mirrors the explanatory relation between those reasons and the normative standard 
she thereby satisfies. In virtue of this, her φing is a normative achievement. Because it consists in 
guidance by a standard, a normative achievement is always not only relative to an action, thought, or 
feeling, but also relative to a particular standard that governs it. To theorize about particular normative 




the second to mirror it in the relevant sense. As I will bring out further in §4, this requires more than 
just a coincidence between normative and motivating reasons.  
 
3. The Centrality of Reasons 
 I have already highlighted that normative reasons can at once bear explanatory relations to our 
actions, thoughts, and feelings, and the standards that govern them. Another way of putting this point 
is to say that normative reasons can at once justify our actions, thoughts, and feelings, and move us 
to them. We can act, think, and feel in response to the very reasons that justify our actions, thoughts, 
and feelings.  And I think they are unique in being able to play both of these roles. This makes a strong 
case for their centrality in normative theory. In this section, I’ll try to explain why I think normative 
reasons are unique in playing this role, and thus, why they play a central and irreplaceable role in 
normative theory.  
 First, why think reasons are explanatorily connected to normative standards? The answer is 
that normative standards like ‘right’ and ‘rational’ govern in a pro toto, or all out, manner. For example, 
when an action is right, its rightness is an overall normative status possessed by the action. By contrast, 
normative reasons govern in a pro tanto, or contributory, manner. To say that A has some reason R to 
φ, or that, R supports A’s φing to some degree, does not by itself inform us what overall normative 
status φing has. However, to say that A has decisive reason to φ, or the balance of A’s reasons favor 
φing, does inform us of an overall normative status of φing: it informs us that A ought, all-things-
considered, to φ. The idea here is that because reasons are contributory, they can compete with each 
other to determine what the balance of reasons favors, which determines overall normative statuses.  
 This sort of observation precedes the popularity of the terminology of normative reasons in 
philosophy. It has long been noted in the history of ethics that a variety of different considerations 




they need to be weighed and balanced against each other in some way. In the 20th century, W.D. Ross 
put this into focus with the notion of a prima facie duty. According to Ross, prima facie duties are to be 
distinguished from what he calls “absolute duty.” A prima facie duty, he writes, is a “parti-resultant 
attribute, i.e. one which belongs to an act in virtue of some one component in its nature. Being one's 
[absolute] duty is a toti-resultant attribute, one which belongs to an act in virtue of its whole nature 
and of nothing less than this” (1930, p. 87). In other words, when one has a prima facie duty to φ, 
φing is supported by something of moral significance – say, fidelity or beneficence. But that does not 
entail that φing is supported overall. Whether one has an absolute duty to φ depends on what the balance 
of prima facie duties supports doing.  
 So, prima facie duties look to be considerations that count in favor of (or against) an action, 
morally speaking, and that compete and combine to determine the overall moral status of that action. 
This sounds an awful lot like the concept of a normative reason for action: a consideration that counts 
in favor of an action. One way of putting Ross’s point, then, is just to say that what we ought to do, 
morally speaking, is determined by the balance of moral reasons.6 This an example of an overall 
normative status of actions, moral rightness, being explained in terms of normative reasons. And once 
we recognize this, it is only natural to extend it to a variety of normative standards. It is, after all, no 
coincidence that whenever we encounter standard-governed actions or attitudes, it is also the case that 
there are normative reasons for and against them. Whether we are talking about moral rightness, 
rationality, epistemic justification, or other overall statuses, there seems to be the prospect of 
competing considerations that are relevant to these overall statuses, and to which we must be sensitive 
when ascertaining them.  
 
6 Phillip Stratton-Lake similarly translates the Rossian point into the language of reasons in the introduction to his edited 




This brings me to the second question: why think reasons are explanatorily connected to 
actions, thoughts, and feelings themselves? The answer is that we settle on what to do, think, and feel 
by considering (explicitly or implicitly) what options our reasons favor. Whenever we encounter 
questions about what to do, think, or feel, we can only weigh our options with regard to the various 
considerations seem to favor or disfavor those options. If all goes well, such deliberation concludes 
in our taking the options that we have judged the balance of reasons to favor. Moreover, it concludes 
in taking those options on the basis of those very reasons. These are the reasons for which we act, believe, 
and feel – what are standardly called motivating reasons.  
Of course, motivating reasons are not necessarily normative reasons, because the reasons for 
which we φ are not necessarily good reasons to φ. They may be, for example, considerations that we 
erroneously judge to be good reasons to φ. In such cases, we might φ for (motivating) reasons but fail 
to φ on the basis of any normative reasons at all. This is an issue I will discuss further in Chapter 2. 
But for now, all that needs to be made clear is that we can φ for (motivating) reasons without φing for 
normative reasons. In such cases, whether it is because there are normative reasons to φ that we fail to 
respond to, or because there simply aren’t any normative reasons to φ, there is clearly no explanatory 
connection between our φing and normative reasons to φ.  
The relevant explanatory connection between φing and normative reasons to φ only occurs 
when there are normative reasons to φ, and moreover, we φ on the basis of those reasons. When we φ 
on the basis of some normative reason R, R is thereby part of the explanation of why we φed. 
Importantly, this explanatory connection mirrors the explanatory connection between normative 
reasons and the overall normative statuses they yield. For example, when one does the right thing 
(what is supported by the balance of moral reasons) on the basis of the reasons that make it right, the 
explanatory connection between one’s action and those moral reasons mirrors the explanatory 




normative reasons play these two mirroring explanatory roles, is the structure of normative 
achievement.7 
Normative reasons are, I think, unique in being able to play these two roles. This is because 
only reasons can at once give rise to overall normative statuses of actions and attitudes and provide 
the bases on which we act, think, and feel. This provides not only a strong case for analyzing normative 
achievements in terms of reasons, but also for the centrality of reasons in normative theory more 
generally. If we not only can advert to reasons to analyze various normative standards, but must advert 
to them to analyze the corresponding normative achievements, this shows that reasons play a central 
and irreplaceable role in normative theory. One thing I will hope to show by example with my analyses 
of moral worth and rationality in Chapters 3-4 is that normative achievements really are to be analyzed 
in terms of normative reasons. This will provide further support for the centrality of reasons in 
normative theory. After doing that, I will return to a general discussion of the centrality of reasons as 
I conclude in Chapter Five.  
 
4. Correctly Responding to Reasons 
 I have claimed that normative achievement consists in complying with a standard in virtue of 
correctly responding to normative reasons that are explanatorily connected to that standard in the 
right way. This raises a crucial question: what is it to correctly respond to a normative reason? In my 
view, before we can fully answer this question, we need to understand what it is to act, believe, and so 
on, for any reasons at all. In other words, we need to understand the concept of a motivating reason. 
That is why, in Chapter 2, I will develop an account of motivating reasons. On that account, motivating 
 
7 What this “mirroring” amounts to is a question that is most easily answered through substantive theorizing about 




reasons are considerations that we represent as normative reasons, where those representations 
explain the actions we perform and attitudes we hold on the basis of those reasons. As I will argue, 
the representation of considerations as normative reasons plays a crucial role in φing for reasons, 
generally. And as will become clear in Chapters 3-4, more specific kinds of representations of our 
reasons play a crucial role in correctly responding those reasons in the sense that is required for 
normative achievements like moral worth and rationality.  
 To give a taste of those arguments: correctly responding to reasons requires more specific 
kinds of representations of our reasons because to correctly respond to reasons in the sense that is 
required for normative achievement is to respond to reasons as the kinds of reasons they are. For 
example, to correctly respond to a moral reason, in the way that could ground the moral worth of an 
action, one must respond to that reason as a moral reason. Otherwise, it’s a mere accident that the reason 
one responds to is a moral reason. This requires representing the consideration on the basis of which 
one acts as a moral reason in particular, as opposed to a normative reason more generally. Only such 
representations can capture the sense in which the success involved in normative achievements is a 
non-accidental form of success that is attributable to us as rational agents.  
 So, φing for some motivating reason R involves representing R as a normative reason to φ, 
and φing in virtue of that. This is necessary, but not sufficient, for correctly responding to some reason 
R, because to correctly respond to R, one must represent R not as any sort of normative reason 
whatsoever, but as the normative reason it is. Crucially, the relevant kind of normative reason will be 
fixed by the nature of the normative achievement in question. Just as normative achievements are 
always relative to particular normative standards, the kinds of normative reasons that must correctly 
respond to for normative achievement is also relative to those standards. As such, what exactly is 




depend partly on the nature of that normative achievement. This will become clear, I hope, when I 
discuss moral worth and rationality in further detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 It is at this point that I wish to proceed to the three more specific discussions that make up 
the bulk of this dissertation: discussions of motivating reasons, moral worth, and rationality. All of 
these discussions will shed light on the nature of normative achievement. The account of motivating 
reasons I provide in Chapter 2 will shed light on normative achievement in two ways. The first is to 
explain the kind of exercise of rational agency that is a precondition for normative achievement. The 
second is to show the necessary role of normative representation in any kind of φing for reasons, as a 
precursor to arguing for more particular kinds of such representation as necessary conditions for 
normative achievement.  
 In Chapter 3, I will provide an account of moral worth that is independently plausible, and 
addresses issues raised in preexisting debates about moral worth. Moreover, it shows how moral worth 
has the structure of normative achievement, while also illustrating some of the important general 
features of normative achievement, such as non-accidentality. In Chapter 4, I will take a similar 
approach to providing an account of rationality. The account I develop solves problems in the 
literature on rationality, shows how rationality has the structure of normative achievement, and helps 
explain some general features of normative achievement, such as correct responsiveness to reasons. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will return to some of the issues taken up in this introductory chapter, and, 
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This chapter is about motivating reasons. Motivating reasons are the reasons for which we act, 
believe, and so on for any φ such that there can be reasons for which we φ.9,10 These reasons are also 
sometimes said to be the reasons in light of which, or the reasons on the basis of which, we act, believe and 
so on. In this chapter, I propose and defend an account of what it is to act or believe for a reason. I 
focus on action and belief because they paradigmatically admit of motivating reasons, but the account 
I offer is generalizable to any such φ.  
The phenomenon of acting or believing for reasons is not an obscure one, but rather a central 
feature of agency that everyone is familiar with pre-theoretically. However, the dominant views about 
motivating reasons have strayed surprisingly far from this pre-theoretical sense. According to 
psychologism, motivating reasons are mental states that cause us to act, believe and so on. According to 
factualism, they are facts in light of which we act, believe and so on. And according to disjunctivism, they 
 
8 This chapter is based on material that previously appeared Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. See Singh (2019) in the 
references section for this chapter.  
9 A note on terminology: it’s standard to use the term ‘motivating reason’ in this way (see for example Alvarez (2010), 
Dancy (2000), Parfit (1997, 2011) and Schroeder (2007). However, it hasn’t been universal. While I am calling the reasons 
for which someone φs her motivating reasons, Scanlon (1998) calls them ‘operative reasons,’ and Enoch (2011) calls them 
‘the agent’s reasons’ while reserving the term motivating reason for something else. Throughout this dissertation, I’ll use 
the terms ‘motivating reason’ and ‘reason for which’ interchangeably to refer to my subject matter.   





are some combination of the above, depending on the case. All of these views have implausible 
implications such that none of them can do justice to the ordinary concept of a motivating reason.  
The account I offer in this chapter does do justice to the ordinary concept of a motivating 
reason. To show this, I draw out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be. I then argue 
that unlike existing views, my account can satisfy all three of these constraints without any significant 
drawbacks. On the account I defend, motivating reasons are propositions. A proposition is the reason 
for which someone φs when (a) she represents that proposition as a normative reason to φ, and (b) 
her representation explains, in the right way, her φing. 
The chapter will proceed as follows. In §2, I explain and defend the three constraints on what 
motivating reasons must be. In §3, I explain why psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism each 
violate at least one of these constraints. In §4, I lay out my positive account of motivating reasons, 
which I call the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. In §5, I respond to several objections to 
this account and defend the claim that it does full justice to the ordinary concept of a motivating 
reason. In §6, I conclude by briefly exploring some of the implications of my account.  
 
2. What Motivating Reasons Must Be 
In this section, I draw out three constraints on what motivating reasons must be. I argue for 
each of these constraints from pre-theoretical starting points and without assuming any particular 
account of motivating reasons. However, one thing I will assume throughout is that motivating 
reasons admit of a unified account that applies to action, belief, and any other φ such that it is possible 
to φ for reasons. Before drawing out these constraints, some clarifications about normative reasons will 




standardly understood as considerations that count in favor of φing,11 whether or not we actually φ on 
the basis of them (or even φ at all). I will use the language of normative reasons and the language of 
counting in favor interchangeably throughout this dissertation.   
Within the ideology of normative reasons, there is also a distinction between there being a 
reason for some agent to φ and the agent’s having a reason to φ. Reasons of the latter kind are sometimes 
referred to as possessed reasons. The relation between the two is controversial, so I will attempt to 
remain as neutral as possible about it.12 But I will often put things, in the examples I use, in terms of 
agents’ having or not having reasons to act, believe and so on. I will assume that it is possible for an 
agent to have a (normative) reason to φ without φing on the basis of that reason, or even at all. With 
these clarifications made, I am now in a position to present the three constraints.  
 2.1. The Good Reasons Constraint 
The first constraint is what I will call the Good Reasons Constraint (GRC). It is a platitude 
that we don’t just act and believe for reasons, but at least some of the time, we act and believe for good 
reasons. The correct account of motivating reasons must capture this platitude, so we need a constraint 
that ensures it will be captured. In order to draw out this constraint, we first need to know what it is 
for the reason for which someone φs to be a good reason. I propose that we understand good reasons 
in the following way: someone φs for a good reason just in case she φs on the basis of a consideration 
that counts in favor of her φing.  
Since a normative reason to φ is just a consideration that counts in favor of φing, GRC can be 
rendered as follows: 
 
11 See, for example Dancy (2000), Parfit (1997, 2011), Raz (1999) and Scanlon (1998).  




Good Reasons Constraint: Motivating reasons must be the kind of thing such that 
it is possible for agents’ motivating reasons to be normative reasons.13  
This is almost as much of a platitude as the statement that we sometimes act and believe for good 
reasons, which is not surprising, since it’s meant to capture that platitude. GRC shouldn’t require 
much by way of further argument, because it’s hard to see any grounds for denying it that are 
independent of trying to defend an account of motivating reasons that violates it. Thus, GRC is a 
genuine constraint on what motivating reasons must be.  
 2.2. The No-good Reasons Constraint 
We sometimes act and believe for good reasons, but we also often act and believe for reasons 
that are not so good. They might be bad reasons, or they might merely fail to be good reasons.14 Either 
way, not every reason for which we act or believe is a good one. This too is a platitude. If, as I have 
claimed, φing for a good reason is just φing for a normative reason, then failing to φ for a good reason 
is naturally understood as φing for a reason that fails to be a normative reason. Since they aren’t 
necessarily bad reasons, let’s call reasons that fail to be good reasons ‘no-good reasons.’ I propose that 
we understand no-good reasons as follows: someone φs for a no-good reason just in case she φs for a 
reason that fails to be a normative reason to φ.  
Normative reasons are standardly understood as facts.15 Thus, there seem to be two ways in 
which an agent’s motivating reason can fail to be a normative reason to φ: (1) by being a fact that fails 
 
13 GRC is roughly equivalent to what Dancy (2000) calls the “Normative Constraint.” 
14 One might think, for example, that considerations the agent mistakenly but reasonably takes to be good reasons are 
neither good reasons nor bad ones.  
15 Though this is the standard view of normative reasons, some argue that normative reasons are not facts, but 
propositions. I will simply assume the standard view that normative reasons are facts. However, the account of motivating 





to count in favor of φing, or (2) by failing to be a fact at all (even if it’s the case that if it were a fact, it 
would count in favor of φing). To make this distinction clear, consider the following two examples:  
Hike. Koah is hiking when he comes upon a mountain lion. He knows that mountain 
lions are dangerous, and on the basis of this, he decides (unreasonably) to fight the 
mountain lion. The mountain lion really is dangerous, but this fact doesn’t count in 
favor of fighting the mountain lion, so Koah has no normative reason to do so. 
Medication. Alice unreasonably believes that she is having an allergic reaction, and 
so on the basis of this, she takes an allergy medication. If she really were having an 
allergic reaction, that would count in favor of taking the medication. But she isn’t, so 
she has no such normative reason to take the medication.  
In Hike, Koah acts for a reason that is a fact but fails to count in favor of his action. In Medication, 
Alice acts for a reason that fails to be a fact at all, even though if it were a fact it would count in favor 
of her action. Both are cases where the reason for which someone acts fails to be a normative reason. 
Koah and Alice both act for no-good reasons. While these cases each involve actions, analogous sets 
of cases involving belief can be easily generated.  
Each of these ways of φing for no-good reasons is common in ordinary life. Thus, a constraint 
that captures our φing for reasons that aren’t good ones should accommodate both. We can render 
such a constraint as follows:  
No-good Reasons Constraint (NRC): motivating reasons must be the kind of thing 
such that agents’ motivating reasons can fail to be normative reasons, either by failing 
to count in favor of φing or by failing to be facts.  
NRC captures both ways in which we can fail to φ for good reasons. Importantly, it does not follow 
from the fact that someone φs for no-good reasons that she doesn’t φ for any reason at all. Intuitively, 
we can have motivating reasons that fail to be normative reasons in both of the ways specified above. 
As with GRC, it’s hard to see any grounds for denying NRC that are independent of any attempt to 
defend an account of motivating reasons that violates it. Thus, NRC is also a genuine constraint on 





 2.3. The Supervenience Constraint 
The last of the three constraints on what motivating reasons must be is a constraint on what 
motivating reasons must supervene on. This is the most controversial of the three constraints, but 
nevertheless can be derived from pre-theoretical starting points. One such starting point, which I hope 
is uncontroversial, is that an agent’s motivating reason must play a motivational role (broadly 
understood) in her psychology. If it did not play this role in her psychology (that of motivating her, in 
a broad sense) it would not be her motivating reason. Thus, whatever a motivating reason is, it must 
be something that can play this psychological role. I mean this starting point to be something capacious 
enough that it doesn’t imply any particular view of what kind of thing motivating reasons are. For it 
isn’t just mental states that play important roles in our psychology, but also the contents of our mental 
state(s), facts we apprehend and even bits of the external world with which we interact. So, any such 
kind of thing could in principle play a role in her psychology.   
Someone’s motivation for φing must in this way be part of her mental life. It’s hard to even 
imagine what it would be for something to motivate someone without interacting at all with her 
psychology, which suggests that it’s constitutive of motivation that it is a psychological phenomenon. 
Of course, not all motivations are motivating reasons, because we can be motivated to φ by things 
that don’t rise to the level of reasons for which we φ. But all motivating reasons are motivations (again, 
broadly understood), so motivating reasons must be part of our mental lives.  
Again, this doesn’t suggest that motivating reasons must be mental states, or anything else in 
particular, because lots of things that aren’t mental states can be part of our mental lives. But it does 
imply that there can’t be a change in what our motivating reasons are without there being some 
corresponding change internal to our psychology. For how could what motivates someone change 
while her psychology remains exactly the same? Similarly, it’s difficult to imagine how two different 




might attempt to capture this thought with the simple claim that motivating reasons supervene on our 
mental states. Unfortunately, this won’t quite do the trick. Following Williamson (2000), many have 
accepted the existence of factive mental states, such as knowledge. But intuitively, motivating reasons 
wouldn’t supervene on these factive mental states, because such mental states would not be fully 
internal to our psychology.   
To see why this is so, we can consider familiar evil demon cases, which are commonly used to 
motivate the supervenience of various properties on non-factive mental states.16 Imagine that in two 
possible worlds, w1 and w2, you have the same experiences, apparent memories and intuitions, and 
reason in the same way to arrive at the same beliefs, actions, and so on. It seems obvious that in both 
worlds your motivating reasons are the same. But now imagine that while in w1 you’re getting things 
mostly right, in w2 you are being systematically deceived by an evil demon. If knowledge is a mental 
state, then your mental states differ between w1 and w2, because in w2 you lack a great deal of 
knowledge that you have in w1. But intuitively, this makes no difference to your motivating reasons; 
since you reason exactly the same way to the exact same beliefs and actions, it remains the case that 
your motivating reasons are the same in both worlds.17  
So, it seems like if there are factive mental states, they aren’t what motivating reasons 
supervene on. This is explained by the fact that factive mental states like knowledge are in some sense 
 
16 Such cases were popularized by Lehrer and Cohen (1983) in their presentation of what has come to be called the ‘new 
evil demon problem’ for reliabilism, but they have since been used to argue for a variety of supervenience constraints. For 
example, Wedgwood (2002) uses evil demon cases to argue that rationality supervenes on non-factive mental states, rather 
than on mental states in general. The argument I present here draws particular inspiration from Wedgwood’s.  
17 The situation becomes a bit more complicated if externalism about mental content is true, because this would entail that 
the contents of non-factive mental states (and therefore also those mental states themselves) would be different in the 
demon world. Given that our motivating reasons are part of our mental lives, this would likely entail some difference in 
our motivating reasons. However, this would be a modest sort of difference. SC is compatible with the occurrence of this 
sort of difference, so whether or not content externalism is true does not affect the plausibility of the constraint (see 




not wholly internal to our psychology. Similar points have been made by both Wedgwood (2002) and 
Schoenfield (2015), but with regard to rationality and justification, respectively. Wedgwood argues that 
the rationality of belief supervenes on the “internal facts” about agents’ mental states, which are the 
facts about our non-factive mental states and the relations between them. Similarly, Schoenfield argues 
that justification supervenes on “internalist conditions,” which are conditions that describe agents’ 
non-factive mental states.  
I won’t take any position on the conditions for rationality or justification here. Rather, I simply 
want to claim that the best way to capture our pre-theoretical views about what motivating reasons 
supervene on is via a similar appeal to what’s internal to us. Thus, we can formulate the supervenience 
constraint as follows: 
Supervenience Constraint (SC): an agent’s motivating reasons supervene on the 
internal facts about her mental states.18  
I am using the term ‘internal facts’ just as Wedgwood does. The internal facts about agents’ mental 
states are the facts about their non-factive mental states and the relations between them. SC, as I have 
rendered it, captures the intuition that there can’t be a change in our motivating reasons without a 
corresponding change internal to our psychology.19  
To be clear, SC does not entail that nothing about someone’s motivating reasons can change 
without a corresponding change in the internal facts about her mental states. For example, one might 
think that whether or not an agent’s motivating reason is a normative reason could change without 
 
18 Thanks to Ram Neta and Julien Dutant for helpful suggestions on how to formulate this constraint.  
19 It’s important to note that accepting SC does not commit us to any objectionably strong form of internalism. It might 
be, for example, that when someone on Earth believes that the substance is H2O, her internal duplicate on Twin Earth 
believes that it is XYZ. Correspondingly, it might be that when someone on Earth’s motivating reason is that the substance 
is H2O, her internal duplicate on Twin Earth’s motivating reason is that the substance is XYZ. SC is fully compatible with 
such conclusions, because it only entails that our motivating reasons are at least as internal as our beliefs and other non-
factive mental states. It does not entail that they are any more so, so it is fully compatible with externalist theses that entail 




any change in the internal facts. But SC is fully compatible with such extrinsic properties of our 
motivating reasons not supervening on the internal facts, because SC is about what the agent’s 
motivating reason is intrinsically and fundamentally. Though I suspect that some will balk at it, SC is 
highly plausible, and it’s hard to see what grounds there could be for denying it that are independent 
of any attempt to defend an account of motivating reasons (or some other philosophical thesis) that 
violates it. Thus, SC is a genuine constraint on what motivating reasons must be.  
To sum up this section: I’ve explained and defended the above three constraints (GRC, NRC 
and SC) from pre-theoretical starting points about what it is to act, believe and so on, for reasons. 
None of these constraints relies on any prior account of motivating reasons for its support, and none 
of them by itself entails any such account. However, as I will show in §3, several of the most popular 
accounts of motivating reasons can’t satisfy all three of these constraints, and thus should be rejected.  
 
3. What Motivating Reasons Cannot Be 
In this section, I argue against three dominant views about what motivating reasons are. These 
views are psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism. According to psychologism, motivating reasons 
are mental states that (in the right way) cause us to φ. According to factualism, they are facts the 
appreciation of which leads us to φ. And according to disjunctivism, they are some combination of 
the above depending on the case.20 None of these views can satisfy all three of the constraints 
identified in §2. So, none of these views is the correct one about what motivating reasons are. I’ll 
consider each view in turn and show why each one violates at least one constraint on what motivating 
reasons must be.  
 
20 Not all versions of these views purport to apply to every φ that admits of motivating reasons. My arguments against these 
views are arguments against the ability of these views to capture motivating reasons for any such φ. Therefore, I take myself 




 3.1. Psychologism 
According to psychologism about motivating reasons, the reason for which someone φs is 
some mental state (or combination of mental states) that (in the right way) causes her to φ.21 Different 
versions of psychologism say different things about which mental states motivating reasons are, and 
about how they must cause us to φ in order to be our motivating reasons. But all versions of 
psychologism hold that motivating reasons are mental states.  
Psychologism violates GRC. According to GRC, motivating reasons must be the kind of the 
thing such that they can be normative reasons. Normative reasons are facts, not mental states.22 So, if 
motivating reasons are mental states, they are not the kind of thing such that they can be normative 
reasons. This is not a new point. Jonathan Dancy (2000) and others have argued extensively against 
psychologism on such grounds, so I won’t spend much time rehashing those arguments here. But I 
take the fact that psychologism violates GRC to count decisively against it as an account of motivating 
reasons. And even those who think that’s too strong should grant that violating GRC is a significant 
mark against psychologism, such that if another account can satisfy GRC (and the other two 
constraints), then we should reject psychologism in favor of that account.  
 3.2. Factualism 
According to factualism about motivating reasons, the reason for which someone φs is some 
fact the appreciation of which leads her to φ.23 So, motivating reasons are not mental states but rather 
facts. Factualists usually claim that the way these facts motivate us is by being the contents of our 
 
21 For examples of psychologism about motivating reasons, see Davidson (1963), Smith (1994, 2003) and Turri (2009).  
22 Defenders of psychologism could, of course, claim that normative reasons are mental states rather than facts. I won’t 
discuss this possibility here, but it does not strike me as an independently plausible view about normative reasons.  




mental states. Unlike psychologism, factualism satisfies GRC; because normative reasons are facts, if 
motivating reasons are facts then it’s obvious that motivating reasons can be normative reasons. So, 
factualism has no problem explaining how we can φ for good reasons. But factualism has a different 
problem. Recall that there are two ways in which an agent’s motivating reason can fail to be a 
normative reason to φ: (1) by being a fact that fails to count in favor of φing, or (2) by failing to be a 
fact at all (even if it’s the case that if it were a fact, it would count in favor of φing). Let’s call the first 
‘normative error’ and the second ‘factual error.’  
Factualism doesn’t have any trouble dealing with normative error. If someone φs for a reason 
that fails to be a normative reason but is still a fact, this is no counterexample to factualism. The 
problem with factualism is that it can’t make sense of factual error. In cases of factual error, the agent’s 
putative motivating reason was not a fact at all; therefore, the factualist must claim that in such cases 
the agent φs for no (motivating) reason at all.24 As I have shown in arguing for NRC, both normative 
error cases and factual error cases seem like ones in which someone fails to φ for a good reason, but 
there’s still some reason for which she φs. But factualism has to deny this in cases of factual error, so 
factualism violates NRC.  
In §2.2, I discussed two cases, Hike and Medication, which help show why NRC is a genuine 
constraint. In Medication just as much as Hike, there is some reason for which the agent acts that 
fails to be a normative reason. So, it’s implausible to hold that in cases of factual error, the agent φed 
for no reason at all. Alice clearly takes her medication for a reason, even though her (motivating) 
reason, which is that she’s having an allergic reaction, is not a fact. Here is an analogous set of cases 
with regard to belief:  
 
24 It could also be argued that in cases of factual error, the agent still has a reason, but it is a different fact (say, a fact about 
her own mental states instead of a worldly fact). I classify this kind of view as a form of disjunctivism and discuss it 




Psychic. Mike visits a psychic, who tells him that the lottery ticket he just bought will 
be the winning ticket. On the basis of this, Mike believes (unreasonably) that his lottery 
ticket will be the winning ticket. The psychic really did tell him that, but this doesn’t 
count in favor of believing it, so it isn’t a normative reason for him to believe it.  
Vaccine. Jenny unreasonably believes that 95% of scientists agree that vaccines cause 
autism. On the basis of this, she believes that vaccines cause autism. If 95% of 
scientists really did agree that vaccines cause autism, this would count in favor of 
believing that vaccines cause autism. But they don’t, so it’s not a normative reason for 
Jenny to believe that.  
Psychic is a case of normative error, whereas Vaccine is a case of factual error. But whether the agent 
believes for a (motivating) reason does not seem to depend on this difference; Jenny believes for a 
reason just as much as Mike does, even though her (motivating) reason is not a fact. It is simply 
implausible to claim, as the factualist does, that Jenny believes for no reason at all.  
 Maria Alvarez (2010, 2016) has offered a defense of factualism against such arguments from 
factual error. Alvarez argues that if the agent’s putative reason for φing was really no good reason at 
all, it is perfectly natural to say the agent φed for no reason at all: 
… it is not always clear that the right way of characterizing the kind of case just 
described is in terms of ‘no good reason’, as opposed to merely ‘no reason’. For 
suppose that my reason for stabbing someone is, say, that I dislike his shoes. It seems 
wrong to say that I had a reason for stabbing him, only not a good reason. One might 
think that in this case I have no reason at all… In the example above, my reason for 
stabbing my victim, namely that I don't like his shoes, is not simply not a good reason 
to stab someone—it is rather no reason to do so. That I dislike someone's shoes is a 
reason; for instance, it is a reason for me not to buy the same shoes. But my dislike of 
the shoes is simply no reason for me to stab their wearer, even if in my aesthetic 
fanaticism I believe it is (Alvarez 2010, p. 143).  
There are two problems with Alvarez’s response. One is that she doesn’t keep the concept of a 
motivating reason sufficiently separate from that of a normative reason. It’s true that in the example 
above, it’s natural to say that the reason for which I stab someone is no reason at all. But this locution 
trades on an ambiguity between two kinds of reasons. The right way to clarify such a sentence is to 
say that the (motivating) reason for which I stab someone is no (normative) reason at all. And that 




 The other problem with Alvarez’s response is that it overgeneralizes. This is because it applies 
not only to cases of factual error but to cases of normative error as well. If Alvarez’s explanation is 
correct, then we should think that anytime an agent φs for reasons that fail to be normative reasons, 
she fails to φ for any reason at all. In other words, Alvarez is committed to the implausible position 
that there is no such phenomenon as φing for bad (or even no-good) reasons.25 Of course, factualists 
could attempt to circumscribe this explanation so that it only applies to cases of factual error. But this 
would be ad hoc. The only justification for claiming that agents φ for no reason in cases of factual error, 
but φ for reasons in cases of normative error, is that these are the verdicts factualism needs. But this 
justification, as we might say, would be no justification at all. Factualism violates NRC, and this counts 
strongly, if not decisively, against it as an account of motivating reasons.   
 As if things weren’t bad enough for factualism, it also violates SC. Recall that according to SC, 
motivating reasons supervene on the internal facts about our mental states. Factualism violates SC 
because it entails that someone can go from having a motivating reason to having no motivating 
reason (and vice versa) without any change in the internal facts about her mental states. Consider the 
following example: 
Airport. Rodrigo’s aunt is coming to visit him and he needs to pick her up from the 
airport when she arrives. Her flight is scheduled to arrive at 5 PM, and on the basis of 
this, Rodrigo forms the belief that she’ll be ready to be picked up around 5:30. A few 
seconds later, the flight gets delayed and is now scheduled to arrive at 6 PM. But 
Rodrigo has stopped checking on the flight and doesn’t see this.  
Initially, it is a fact that the flight is scheduled to arrive at 5 PM, so the factualist can rightly say that 
Rodrigo believes for a reason (namely, the fact in question). However, a few seconds later, it’s no 
longer a fact that the flight is scheduled to arrive at 5 PM. Since this is no longer a fact, the factualist 
has to say that Rodrigo no longer believes for a reason. This is implausible. Certainly, by Rodrigo’s 
 




own lights, he continues to believe for a reason, and it would be quite odd to claim that he’s suddenly 
confused about this. SC can explain what’s wrong with the above verdict. According to SC, the reason 
for which Rodrigo believes must supervene on the internal facts about his mental states. But according 
to the factualist, Rodrigo has gone from having a motivating reason to having none at all, without any 
corresponding change in the internal facts. In addition to violating NRC, factualism violates SC. 
Therefore, we should reject factualism.  
3.3. Disjunctivism 
 Disjunctivism about motivating reasons is the view that agents’ motivating reasons are 
different things depending on the kind of case.26 Disjunctivists often draw the line along certain kinds 
of error cases, so that motivating reasons are one thing in non-error cases and another in error cases.27 
Some disjunctivists say that motivating reasons are facts in the non-error cases and mental states in 
the error cases. Others say they are worldly facts in the non-error cases and facts about mental states 
in the error cases.28 Here’s a simple way to understand the appeal of disjunctivism: by saying different 
things about error cases and non-error cases, it incorporates the best of both psychologism and 
factualism. Disjunctivists go factualist about non-error cases, so like the factualist, they have no trouble 
explaining how it’s possible to φ for good reasons. Thus, they satisfy GRC.  
 
26 For examples of disjunctivism about motivating reasons, see Hornsby (2008) and Hyman (1999, 2015). Williamson 
(2000) also seems to favor some kind of disjunctivism.  
27 Normative error and factual error are often insufficiently distinguished in the literature on motivating reasons. In 
principle, disjunctivists could draw the line in all sorts of ways, but since factual error cases are the troubling ones, it would 
make sense for them to draw the line along cases of factual error. Sometimes they draw the line along whether the agent 
has knowledge or not, which yields similar results to drawing the line along factual error cases.  
28 We might call this latter version of the view ‘factualist disjunctivism.’ Though it holds that motivating reasons are always 
facts, it still merits being classified as a form of disjunctivism because it holds that they’re two different kinds of fact in 
error cases and non-error cases. And while defenders of factualist disjunctivism don’t necessarily refer to themselves as 
either factualists or disjunctivists, their view is closer to a standard disjunctivist view than it is to views (like Alvarez’s) that 




 When it comes to error cases, disjunctivists claim either that motivating reasons are mental 
states or that they are facts about mental states. So, like psychologism, disjunctivism has no trouble 
explaining how it’s possible to φ for reasons in cases of factual error. For example, in Psychic, Mike’s 
motivating reason would be the fact that the psychic told him his ticket would win (a worldly fact). In 
Vaccine, by contrast, Jenny’s motivating reason would be the fact that she believes that 95% of 
scientists agree that vaccines cause autism (a fact about her mental states). This may make 
disjunctivism seem very appealing. However, like factualism, disjunctivism violates SC. Recall Airport, 
in which Rodrigo’s aunt’s flight gets delayed. The disjunctivist is committed to saying that when her 
flight gets delayed, Rodrigo’s motivating reason for believing that his aunt will be outside the airport 
at 5:30 changes from the fact that her flight is scheduled to land at 5 to his belief that it’s scheduled to 
land at 5 (or the fact that he believes this). 
 This is an implausible verdict in the same way factualism’s verdict is. It certainly isn’t true to 
the phenomenology of such cases; by Rodrigo’s own lights, his reason remains the same throughout 
the case. And it would be quite odd to say that just because his aunt’s flight got delayed, he suddenly 
becomes confused about the reason for which he believes. Furthermore, there’s no change in the 
internal facts about Rodrigo’s mental states, and so nothing that could explain a change in his 
motivating reasons.29 SC can explain why this kind of verdict is so implausible. According to SC, 
because Rodrigo’s motivating reasons supervene on the internal facts about his mental states, there 
can’t be a change in his motivating reason without a corresponding change in the internal facts. 
Disjunctivism violates SC, so we should reject disjunctivism. 
 
29 Disjunctivists might attempt to appeal to content externalism to show that there can be changes in our motivating reasons 
in these sorts of transition cases. However, the kinds of changes content externalism would underwrite in such cases would 




 The three views I’ve discussed in this section all have some things going for them. 
Psychologism makes sense of how we can φ for reasons that fail to be good ones, and makes sense of 
the fact that motivating reasons must play a particular role in our psychology. Factualism makes sense 
of how we can φ for good reasons. And disjunctivism can make sense both of φing for good reasons 
and φing for not so good ones. But none of these views satisfies all three constraints on what 
motivating reasons must be, so each of them fails to capture the ordinary concept of a motivating 
reason. Defenders of these views might respond by claiming that these constraints simply can’t all be 
satisfied, and that the ordinary concept (insofar as I’m right about it) is incoherent, so we must opt 
for a revisionary account. But this is false. In the next section, I will lay out my own account, which 
satisfies all three constraints and fully captures the ordinary concept of a motivating reason.  
 
4. What Motivating Reasons Are 
 In the previous section, I argued that psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism all fail to 
capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. In this section, I will defend a form of 
propositionalism about motivating reasons.30 As I will argue, the view on which motivating reasons are 
propositions can capture the ordinary concept of a motivating reason. In order to show this, it will be 
necessary to provide an account of how propositions get to be motivating reasons. In doing so, I will 
offer not just an ontology of motivating reasons, but a fuller account thereof. This account will make 
it clear how a view on which motivating reasons are propositions can capture all three constraints on 
what motivating reasons must be. Here is the account: 
 
30 The term ‘propositionalism’ is used by Comesaña and McGrath (2016) to describe their account of perceptual reasons, 
which is similar to the account of motivating reasons I present in this chapter. Importantly, though, perceptual reasons are 
a kind of normative reason for belief. As far as I know, no one has yet offered a fully developed propositionalist account of 
motivating reasons. However, Comesaña and McGrath (2014), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Scanlon (1998) and Schroeder 




The Guise of Normative Reasons Account: an agent φs on the basis of some 
(motivating) reason R just in case: (a) she represents R as a normative reason to φ, and 
(b) her representation explains, in the right way, her φing.31  
In the remainder of this section, I’ll explain what these two conditions amount to, and how the Guise 
of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three of the constraints given in §2.   
4.1. Representing as a Normative Reason 
 The Guise of Normative Reasons Account agrees with psychologism that an agent’s 
motivating reason is something internal to her psychology. However, her reason is not her mental 
state, but rather the content thereof. This is a highly intuitive way of thinking about motivating reasons; 
when we cite the reasons for which we φ, we tend to the cite considerations we take to count in favor 
of φing, more so than whatever mental states are constituted by our taking them so. Considerations 
are so named because they’re the kinds of things we consider when we’re reasoning about what to do, 
believe, and so on. So, the best way to understand considerations in this context is as propositions 
that are the contents of the mental states that figure into our reasoning. On my account, the reasons 
for which we φ are propositions that we represent as counting in favor of φing.  
 I’m now in a position to explain what it is to represent some consideration as a normative 
reason to φ. Because a normative reason to φ is just a consideration that counts in favor of φing, to 
represent some consideration as such is just to represent the proposition in question as standing in 
the counts-in-favor relation to φing. I have a very thin sense of representation in mind here, where to 
represent A as F is just to pick out A under the concept ‘F’. This can be expanded to representing 
relations between things; to represent A and B as standing in relation L is just to pick out A and B 
under the relational concept ‘L’. So, to represent a proposition as counting in favor of φing is to pick 
 
31 As its name suggests, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account has its roots in various “guise of the good” theses that 
have existed in various forms since at least Plato. Darwall (1983, p. 32) gestures at a guise of normative reasons sort of 




out that proposition and φing under the relational concept ‘counts-in-favor.’32 An example will be 
helpful. Let’s say I believe that it rained last night, and the reason for which I believe that is that the 
streets are wet this morning. On my account, I apply the concept of the counts-in-favor relation to 
the proposition ‘the streets are wet this morning’ and the belief that it rained last night, and it is partly 
in virtue of this that the above proposition is the reason for which I believe.  
 There are three important clarifications to be made here. The first is that while motivating 
reasons are propositions that are the contents of representational states, they aren’t necessarily the 
contents of beliefs (although they can be). This is because the representations in question can (and often 
do) fall short of belief. This gets things right, because intuitively some proposition p can be the reason 
for which I φ without my believing that p.33 The second clarification is that it isn’t necessary for the 
agent to apply the concept of the counts-in-favor relation under that description. Someone need not 
be able to call it the counts-in-favor relation, the normative reason relation or anything else in 
particular, in order to have the capacity to φ for reasons. The concept ‘counts-in-favor’ is just the 
concept of a simple relation of normative support, and plausibly one every agent has, though under 
various descriptions.  
 The third clarification is that the agent’s representing some proposition as a normative reason 
to φ does not entail a judgment on her part that it is all-things considered what she has most reason 
to φ, what she ought to φ, what is right to φ or what is worth φing. It only entails that from her point 
of view, φing has something going for it, even if that something is outweighed or defeated. Thus, my 
account does not preclude the existence of various kinds of akrasia, including the kind of ‘inverse 
 
32 This way of understanding the kind of representation in question draws inspiration from Neta (2019).    
33 Of course, one could have a very thin conception of belief, on which these representations necessarily do count as beliefs. 




akrasia’ discussed by Arpaly (2015).34 The importance of each of the above clarifications will become 
clear when I respond to some objections to my account in §5, and will, I hope, help to preempt others. 
But for now, I’ll move on to explaining the second necessary condition on a proposition’s being a 
motivating reason.  
4.2. The Right Kind of Explanation 
 Representing some proposition p as a normative reason to φ is necessary, but not sufficient 
for that proposition to be the reason for which the agent φs. For she might represent p as a normative 
reason to φ without actually φing. Or she might represent p as a normative reason to φ, and φ only on 
the basis of some other consideration(s) altogether. For example: 
Selfish. Jordy is considering whether or not to volunteer at a charity. He knows that 
the fact that volunteering would help others counts in favor of doing it, but this doesn’t 
motivate him to volunteer.35 However, he also knows that volunteering would impress 
a romantic interest, and on the basis of this, he selfishly decides to volunteer.   
Plausibly, if Jordy knows that the fact that volunteering would help others counts in favor of doing it, 
then a fortiori he represents the proposition that volunteering would help others as counting in favor 
of doing it. However, he doesn’t volunteer on the basis of this consideration. Rather, the reason for 
which he volunteers is that it will impress a romantic interest.  
 This shows that merely representing some consideration as counting in favor of φing isn’t a 
sufficient condition for that consideration to be a motivating reason. In order for a consideration to 
be the reason for which someone φs, it must also be the case that this representation explains, in the 
right way, her φing. The proposition that volunteering would help others isn’t Jordy’s motivating 
 
34 In standard examples of akrasia, the agent φs while judging that she ought not to φ, or that she has decisive reason not 
to φ. This is compatible with her judging that she has some (outweighed or defeated) reason to φ. In Arpaly’s cases of 
inverse akrasia, the agent φs while incorrectly judging that she ought not to φ. Such cases are also compatible with my account.  
35 I assume here that if motivational internalism of some kind is true, it isn’t true in so strong a form as to preclude that 




reason because his representing it as counting in favor of volunteering doesn’t explain why he φed at 
all, let alone in the right way. 36 
 It’s natural to think that when we explain an agent’s action, belief, or some other such φ by 
citing the reasons for which she φed, we render her φing intelligible in a certain way.37 As it happens, I 
think this kind of intelligibility is precisely what is ordinarily yielded when the agent’s φing is explained 
by her representing some proposition(s) as counting in favor of φing. For the agent herself, the action 
is clearly intelligible, because there is something that counts in favor of it.  But even third-personally, 
the action has a kind of minimal intelligibility, because we can at least see how, from the agent’s own 
perspective, φing has something going for it. Thus, to explain, in the right way, an agent’s φing is to 
render it intelligible in this minimal sense. 
 This point is, I think, similar to what Davidson had in mind when he wrote that because “from 
the agent's point of view there was, when he acted, something to be said for the action,” there is a 
“somewhat anemic sense” in which such an explanation justifies the action (pp. 690-691). However, 
I use the language of intelligibility rather than that of justification to bring out just how minimal of an 
achievement it is simply to φ for any reason at all. An action or belief that is intelligible can still be 
criticized as irrational or unjustified, not to mention irresponsible, foolish, delusional, and so on.38 
In fact, an agent’s φing must be in this minimal sense intelligible to be criticized as irrational. This is 
because for an agent’s action to be minimally intelligible is for it to be fit for further normative 
 
36 Even if Jordy’s representation did explain why he φed, this wouldn’t necessarily meet the second condition, because 
there are cases that seem obviously to involve the wrong kind of explanation. Davidsonians, and others who think that 
reasons explanations are causal, would likely cite deviant causal chain cases as paradigmatic cases of the wrong kind of 
explanation. However, I wish to remain neutral about whether or not reasons explanations are causal, while recognizing 
that whether or not they are, deviant causal chain cases are of the sort that should be able to be ruled out by my account.  
37 For examples of this sort of thought about intelligibility, see Velleman (1989), Raz (1999), Lord and Sylvan (forthcoming) 
and Lord (2018). 




appraisal (as, for example, rational or irrational). And when we explain someone’s φing by citing the 
reason for which she φed, this is precisely the way in which we render her it intelligible; we make it fit 
for appraisal as rational or irrational. In other words, citing the reason for which someone φs places 
her φing in the space of reasons.  
 The idea that citing the agent’s motivating reason provides an explanation of this kind is a 
familiar one that has been floated on and off in discussions of reasons explanation, though not always 
in terms of intelligibility.39 For example, here is Dancy on the subject: 
Appeal to reasons-for-which plays a specific role in the understanding, of which the 
idea of a feature which in the context calls for a response of a certain type is central, 
and any explanatory potential derives from that central idea, rather than being identical 
with it. An agent who acts for a reason acts in the light of a certain consideration, and 
in coming to learn what that consideration was, we understand the action from the 
point of view of the agent. The agent, in acting, had his eye on a certain consideration, 
and being told about that…we learn some part of the explanation of his so acting.40 
Dancy’s point can be generalized from one about action to one about any φ that admits of motivating 
reasons. Citing the reason for which the agent φs constitutes a particular explanatory achievement 
(what I am calling intelligibility) because in showing us what she took to count in favor of φing, it 
allows us to see her φing from her own point of view, and thus to appraise her φing as rational or 
irrational.  
 In Selfish, Jordy’s volunteering is not rendered intelligible by his representing its helping 
others as counting in favor of it, even though he does represent it as such. Rather, it is rendered 
intelligible by his representing its impressing his romantic interest as counting in favor it. This helps 
to show why the fact that it would help others is not the reason for which Jordy volunteers, despite 
 
39 See Dray (1957), Kim (2010) and Dancy (2014).  




the fact that he represents it as counting in favor of volunteering.41  These points are, I hope, somewhat 
commonsensical. When an agent φs for no reason at all, neither she nor anyone else can place her φing 
in the space of reasons.42 Neither she nor anyone else can make sense of her φing, or assess it as 
rational or irrational. It is unintelligible. For someone to φ for some reason, then, it must be the case 
that citing that reason renders her φing intelligible.  
4.3. Constraints Revisited 
 Now that I’ve explained the basics of the of the Guise of Normative Reasons Account, I am 
in a position to show how it satisfies all three of the constraints presented in §2. First, consider GRC. 
It says that motivating reasons must be the kind of thing such that it is possible for agents’ motivating 
reasons to be normative reasons. On my account, motivating reasons are propositions. Normative 
reasons, however, are facts. So, to satisfy GRC, motivating reasons must at least sometimes be facts. 
Fortunately, it’s plausible to think that when propositions are true, that makes them facts. For the 
most part, I’ll just assume that true propositions are facts. But here is one reason to think they are: as 
I pointed out in §4.1, considerations are best understood as propositions. So, if a normative reason is 
a consideration, it must be a kind of proposition. And if a normative reason is a fact, then a fact must 
be a kind of proposition.43 If facts are just true propositions, then it is straightforward how my account 
 
41 I have avoided providing an example where the representation does explain the agent’s Ф-ing, but nevertheless fails to 
render it intelligible. This is because I want to remain neutral about whether or not reasons explanations are causal, and 
what makes it the case that some explanation delivers intelligibility will partly depend on the answer to that question.  
42 Of course, if an agent φs for no reason at all, there is still some explanation of her φing – some reason why she φed. 
However, such an explanation can’t play the role of showing her Ф-ing to be intelligible; it doesn’t allow us to place it in 
the space of reasons. 
43 It would be even simpler for my view for it to turn out that normative reasons are (fundamentally) propositions. 
However, since the orthodox view is that they are facts, and this chapter is not about the ontology of normative reasons, 




satisfies GRC. In any case of φing for a normative reason, the consideration on the basis of which the 
agent φs must be a true proposition, not a false one. Therefore, it must be a fact.  
 Next, consider NRC. It says that motivating reasons must be the kind of thing such that the 
reasons for which agents φ can fail to be normative reasons, either by failing to count in favor of φing 
or by failing to be facts. It’s fairly straightforward how my account satisfies NRC. One can φ on the 
basis of a proposition that’s a fact but fails to count in favor of φing. Or, one can φ on the basis of a 
proposition that’s false and so fails to be a fact. Since these are just the two ways NRC says agents can 
φ for reasons that fail to be normative reasons, my account satisfies NRC.44 
 Third, consider SC. It says that motivating reasons must be the kind of thing such that they 
supervene on the internal facts about agents’ mental states. On my account, motivating reasons are 
propositions that are the contents of a particular kind of non-factive mental state. So, if someone’s 
motivating reason changes, then so must the internal facts about her mental states. Thus, agents’ 
motivating reasons supervene on the internal facts about their mental states, and SC is satisfied. Of 
course, some things about agents’ motivating reasons can change without their mental states changing, 
such as whether those reasons are facts or merely false propositions. However, these are mere 
Cambridge changes – changes in the extrinsic features of those reasons, not what the reasons 
fundamentally are – so, such changes don’t violate SC.  
 Psychologism, factualism and disjunctivism all fail to satisfy at least one of the three constraints 
on what motivating reasons must be. By contrast, the version of propositionalism I’ve developed here, 
the Guise of Normative Reasons Account, satisfies all three of them. Thus, we should accept the 
Guise of Normative Reasons Account of motivating reasons.  
 
44 As Alex Worsnip has helpfully pointed out to me, this point may help to diagnose one of the factualist’s key mistakes, 
which is the assumption that because some motivating reasons must be facts, motivating reasons must always be facts. On 




5. Objections and Replies 
 In this section, I’ll respond to some objections to the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. 
I won’t be able to respond to every objection I have encountered, so I’ll focus on what I take to be 
the most pressing worries for my account.  
 5.1. Overintellectualization 
 I’ve claimed that φing for a reason involves representing the counts-in-favor relation between 
a proposition (the reason) and φing. Some might worry that this overintellectualizes motivating reasons 
because this kind of representation is too abstract or obscure to be what is ordinarily going on when 
we φ for reasons. I disagree. The kind of representation I have in mind isn’t very abstract, and it’s not 
at all obscure. To be able to represent the counts-in-favor relation in this way, all the agent has to do 
is be able to pick out a proposition and some φ under the concept ‘counts-in-favor.’  
 Two clarifications from §4.1 bear repeating here. The first is that the agent’s representation of 
a proposition as counting in favor of φing doesn’t entail the belief that it counts in favor of φing. This 
would be an overintellectual condition on motivating reasons, but it’s not what my account says. The 
second is that the representation in question is a de re representation; the agent need not represent the 
counts-in-favor relation de dicto. In other words, as long as the concept ‘counts-in-favor’ is being 
applied, it need not be applied under that description. If the agent needed to represent the counts-in-
favor relation de dicto, or believe the proposition being represented, this would overintellectualize 
motivating reasons. But my account entails neither of these conditions. On my account, the capacity 
to φ for reasons only requires the capacity to apply a particular normative concept. Since the concept 




agent has under some description or the other, it’s plausible to think any agent is capable of the kind 
of de re representation required by my account.45  
5.2. Explanatory Impotence 
 Another worry some might have about the Guise of Normative Reasons Account is that it 
can’t explain the explanatory status of motivating reasons. It’s become somewhat of a dogma in 
discussions of motivating reasons that they are a subset of so-called explanatory reasons, or reasons 
why. But on my account, motivating reasons are propositions, and not always true ones. The worry, 
then, is this: explanatory reasons must be facts, because explanations are factive.46 If motivating 
reasons are a subset of explanatory reasons, then they also must be facts. Motivating reasons can never 
be false propositions, because false propositions can’t explain.  
 I deny that motivating reasons are a subset of explanatory reasons. As I explained in §4.2, 
when someone φs for a reason, her motivating reason is the content of a representational state that 
explains, in the right way, her φing. Thus, the reason why she φs is this representation, whereas the 
reason for which she φs is its content. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this that motivating 
reasons are explanatorily impotent on my account. To think that F must be the reason why G in order 
to play any role in the explanation of G is to drastically oversimplify how explanation works. F can 
play a substantial, indeed indispensable, role in the explanation of G without being the reason why G, 
when F is a necessary component of the reason why G.  
 
45 It might be further objected that in cases of small children, or perhaps some non-human animals, this will still be too 
intellectual, as they don’t possess the concept ‘counts-in-favor’. My response to this is simply to insist that, if they are really 
agents and can really act and believe for (motivating) reasons, then of course they have this concept.  
46 Dancy (2000) responded to a worry like this by claiming that explanations don’t need to be factive. Such a response has 




 Let’s apply this: if the reason why someone φs is that she represented some proposition as 
counting in favor of φing, then that proposition is a necessary component of the explanation of her 
φing, even though it’s not itself the explanation of her φing. We can’t explain her φing in the right way 
without citing the proposition. More precisely, we can’t show her φing to be intelligible without shedding 
light on what consideration(s) she took to count in favor of φing. And to do this, we need to cite those 
considerations. This point generalizes to all cases in which we explain things by reference to agents’ 
mental states. In all such cases, it’s not just the bare fact of the agent’s being in some mental state that 
does the explanatory work. We need to cite the content of her mental state to really explain things. So, 
even if mental contents are abstract objects like propositions and so aren’t explanatory reasons, it’s 
clear that such things are necessary components of such explanations.  
 The objector may not yet be satisfied. She might further push the objection in the following 
way: in cases where someone φs on the basis of a fact, it seems right to say that she φs because of that 
fact. For example, if the reason for which I pick up the pace is that I’m late for work (and I actually 
am late for work), it seems right to say that I pick up the pace because I’m late for work. But doesn’t 
my account improperly yield the verdict that instead I picked up the pace not because I’m late for 
work, but because I represented being late for work as counting in favor of doing so?  
 I agree that in the example above it’s right to say that I pick up the pace because I’m late for 
work. Fortunately, my account can not only accommodate, but also explain, this verdict. When I pick 
up the pace because I’m late, it’s clearly also the case that I pick up the pace because I take myself to 
be late. Thus, some mental state of mine is a reason why I pick up the pace. But, if we make the 
plausible assumption that my taking myself to be late is in some sense an appreciation of my actual 
lateness, then the reason why I take myself to be late is that I am late. And since reasons why are 




 This doesn’t just vindicate the intuition that it’s right to say I pick up the pace because I’m 
late. It also vindicates the intuition that in non-error cases, the reason for which I φ is also the reason 
why I φ. If the reason for which I pick up the pace is the fact that I’m late, and the fact that I’m late is 
the reason why I represent that fact as counting in favor of picking up the pace, then my motivating 
reason is token-identical with an explanatory reason. By contrast, my account yields the verdict that, 
in cases of factual error, motivating reasons are not explanatory reasons. But there’s nothing strange 
or counterintuitive about this; it’s perfectly plausible to think that one of the unfortunate things about 
cases of factual error is that my action isn’t explained by the facts that I take to count in favor of φing. 
Instead, because there are no such facts for me to be appreciating, my taking what I do to count in 
favor of φing must be explained by something else. 47, 48  
 5.3. Transparently Bad Reasons 
 The third and final objection I’ll consider concerns motivating reasons that one might think 
the agent doesn’t take to be normative reasons at all. Putative cases of such reasons are ones where 
the someone φs for a reason that’s a bad (or no-good) reason by her own lights.  Let’s consider a few 
such cases: 
 
47 It might be yet further objected that this is an unacceptable conclusion because “A’s reason for φing was that p” entails 
“A φed because p.” However, insofar as the former really does entail the latter, I think it only entails it in a very weak sense 
of ‘because,’ in which “A φed because p” does not itself entail that p. Rather, as Comesaña and McGrath (2014) argue, p is 
a defeasible presupposition of sentences like “A φed because p.” For example, in the right conversational context, it’s fine 
to say something like “She went home because she had left the stove on, but when she reached home, she realized she 
hadn’t left it on after all.” So, if motivating reason statements entail these very weak ‘because’ statements, that isn’t a 
problem for my account. Similarly, it can be fine to say “Her reason for going home was that she left the stove on, but 
when she reached home, she realized she hadn’t left it on after all.” The supposed factive entailment of motivating reason 
statements has been greatly overstated by factualists.  
48 Thus, I can also accommodate the disjunctivist conclusion about explanatory reasons defended by Hornsby (2008) and 
others. On my view, there’s no problem with such a conclusion, because unlike motivating reasons, explanatory reasons aren’t 
plausibly construed as supervening on the internal facts about our mental states. Dancy (2008) similarly suggests in 
response to Hornsby that a difference in the explanation of someone’s action between error and non-error cases doesn’t 




Malevolent. The reason for which Caligula tortures his victims is that it will inflict 
pain on them, yet Caligula is fully aware that this is a bad reason – it does not count in 
favor of torturing them.  
This kind of case is unconvincing because it relies for its intuitive plausibility on a conflation between 
distinctively moral reasons and normative reasons in general. Caligula could be fully aware that his 
motivating reason is a morally bad one in the sense that it’s no moral reason to torture, while still 
representing it as a normative reason of some other kind. In fact, it’s quite implausible to imagine that 
Caligula really doesn’t see anything at all as counting in favor of his action, and yet also really does it for 
a reason as opposed to merely being pushed around by his psychotic impulses.   
Irrational. Luke goes downstairs for the umpteenth time to check that his front door 
is locked. His (motivating) reason for doing this is that he might have forgotten to 
actually lock the door the last time he went downstairs to check. But he’s fully aware 
that this is a bad reason and he’s being irrational; it doesn’t really count in favor of 
going downstairs.  
This case is slightly more plausible than the Caligula case, because it doesn’t rely on any kind of 
conflation between kinds of normative reasons. Ultimately, however, it’s similarly implausible to 
imagine that Luke really doesn’t see anything at all as counting in favor of his action, and yet also really 
does it for a reason, as opposed to being pushed around by a neurotic compulsion.  
 Luke might not straightforwardly believe that the miniscule chance that he forgot to lock the 
door counts in favor of going downstairs. But it’s plausible to think that if this is really his motivating 
reason, he must on some level represent it as a normative reason to go downstairs (even if an 
outweighed or defeated one). Otherwise, his action would be unintelligible. If he really acts for a 
reason, it can’t be the case that his action is unintelligible. So, either he represents it as a normative 
reason, or he doesn’t really act for that reason. Furthermore, even if he doesn’t really act for that 
reason, it’s still possible that his thinking there’s a chance he forgot to lock the door explains his action 
– after all, some actions can surely be explained by mere compulsions.  




Dream. The reason for which Leia believes that God exists is that she had a dream 
that God spoke to her. But she doesn’t think this is really any evidence that God exists, 
and is fully convinced that it’s a bad reason to believe this – one that doesn’t at all 
count in favor of believing it.  
In cases like DREAM, we might say things like “I know this isn’t a good reason to believe that p, but 
I just can’t help believing it.” Just like in cases involving action, there are two ways to understand 
what’s going on in such a situation. It might be that Leia doesn’t really believe for any (motivating) 
reason at all, but rather her belief is foisted upon her by the force and vivacity of her dream-experience. 
Of course, if this is the case, her dream-experience could still explain her belief in some other way. 
On another way of understanding Leia’s situation, despite knowing full well that her having this 
dream-experience doesn’t count in favor of believing that God exists, she nevertheless represents it 
on some level as a normative reason (again, even if an outweighed or defeated one). One of these 
interpretations must be correct, and neither presents a counterexample to my account.  
 I suspect that all putative counterexamples of this form have the same problem. In all of them, 
it will be plausible to either interpret the agent as on some level representing the consideration as a 
normative reason to φ (even if an outweighed or defeated one), or to interpret her as not really φing 
on the basis of that reason after all. So, I don’t think any example of this form is a true counterexample 
to my account.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter, I’ve identified three constraints on what motivating reasons must be. 
According to these constraints, motivating reasons must be the kind of thing such that (a) they can be 
normative reasons, (b) they can fail to be normative reasons in both normative error cases and factual 
error cases, and (c) they supervene on the internal facts about our mental states.  I’ve then shown that 




satisfy these constraints. Psychologism can’t make sense of how we can act and believe for normative 
reasons. Factualism can’t make sense of how we can act and believe for any reasons at all in cases of 
factual error. And neither factualism nor disjunctivism can make sense of the connection between 
motivating reasons and our mental lives.  
 Finally, I’ve presented my positive account, the Guise of Normative Reasons Account. 
According to this account, the reasons for which someone acts or believes are propositions that she 
represents as counting in favor of acting or believing, where this representation explains her action or 
belief by rendering it intelligible. The Guise of Normative Reasons Account satisfies all three 
constraints, and weathers what I take to be the most pressing objections to it. It captures the ordinary 
concept of a motivating reason in a manner applicable to any φ to which that concept can be applied, 
including but not limited to action and belief.  
 Perhaps the most important upshot of this chapter is that φing for any (motivating) reason at 
all requires representing the consideration that constitutes ones motivating reason as a normative 
reason to φ. And one can φ for some reason whether or not one’s representation of it as a normative 
reason is accurate. This sheds some light on what it is to correctly respond to normative reasons, and 
thus, on normative achievement. On the assumption that φing on the basis of motivating reasons is 
necessary but not sufficient for correctly responding to normative reasons, we now have a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for normative achievement. In the following two chapters, I’ll defend 
accounts of moral worth and rationality, and in the process, I’ll draw out further conditions on 
normative achievement. In particular, I’ll argue that even accurately representing a consideration as a 
normative reason is not sufficient for correctly responding to that reason. Over and above that, one 
must represent one’s reasons as the reasons they are – that is, one must respond to those reasons in their 
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CHAPTER 3: MORAL WORTH, CREDIT, AND NON-ACCIDENTALITY49 
 
1. Introduction 
When someone does the right thing – what she morally ought to do – there is a certain kind 
of success involved. Her action complies with a moral standard. However, it is a further question 
whether she was guided by this standard in action, as opposed to merely complying with it. In other 
words, it is a further question whether she is creditworthy for her success, in the sense that her success 
is attributable to her as an agent. This is the question of whether or not her action has moral worth. 
While extant accounts of moral worth have to some degree recognized the importance of the 
connection between moral worth and credit, they have been unable to fully capture it.50 As such, they 
have been unable to fully capture the sense in which morally worthy action is a normative achievement. 
The goal of this chapter is to present an account that fully captures the independently plausible 
connection between moral worth and credit, and in doing so, to shed light on the structure of 
normative achievement.  
The necessary connection between moral worth and credit can be given voice through the 
claim that one cannot perform a morally worthy action by accidentally doing the right thing. We don’t 
deserve credit for complying with some standard if our compliance is a mere accident. Because morally 
 
49 This chapter is based on a paper that is forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. See Singh (forthcoming) in the 
references section for this chapter. 
50 Some put this point in terms of praiseworthiness rather than creditworthiness. But creditworthiness is a better notion 
to appeal to because creditworthiness for different kinds of success is more closely tied to whether agents’ success is 
attributable to them, whereas praiseworthiness is more closely tied to social and other factors that are orthogonal to moral 




worthy action consists in the agent’s deserving credit for doing the right thing, one cannot perform a 
morally worthy action by accidentally doing the right thing. Call this the ‘non-accidentality condition.’ 
Contemporary accounts of moral worth endorse the non-accidentality condition. They also agree that 
whether a token action is non-accidentally right in the relevant sense depends on its agent’s 
motivations. In order for her action to be morally worthy, an agent must not only do the right thing, 
but do it for the right reasons. These accounts disagree, however, about which motivating reasons are 
the right reasons to satisfy the non-accidentality condition.  
There are two main views here, which have gone by various names in the literature. I’ll call 
them the Right-Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View. According to the Right-Making 
Features View, morally worthy action is motivated by the features of the action that make it right. 
According to the Rightness Itself View, morally worthy action is motivated by the action’s rightness 
itself.51 Defenders of each view think theirs is uniquely able to satisfy this non-accidentality condition. 
By contrast, much of what I’ll argue in this chapter is that neither view secures non-accidentality. Each 
view leaves room for cases where agents don’t deserve credit for doing the right thing, despite their 
actions being motivated in the requisite way.  
As I’ll argue, each of these views makes a similar mistake. Each assumes morally worthy 
actions have as their motivational content exclusively either right-making features or rightness itself. 
In this chapter, I’ll develop an account of moral worth that rejects this assumption. On my account, a 
right action has moral worth if and only if it is motivated by sufficient moral reasons as such. I call this 
account the Guise of Moral Reasons account. The Guise of Moral Reasons account combines insights 
 
51 The debate over the right kind of motivation for morally worthy action is sometimes framed in terms of de dicto versus 
de re moral motivation. I avoid this framing because I think it is mistaken for a variety of reasons. One such reason is that 
we can be motivated by rightness itself, or by right-making features, under various descriptions. Would this count as de 




from both the Right-Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View in a way that satisfies the 
non-accidentality condition.  
The chapter will proceed as follows. In §2, I further motivate and explain the non-accidentality 
condition. §§3-4 argue that both the Right-Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View fail to 
satisfy it. In §5, I develop my own account and show that it succeeds at securing non-accidentality. §6 
ties up some loose ends, including what my account says about the oft-discussed case of Huck Finn. 
§7 offers brief concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Non-Accidentality Condition 
If an agent performs a morally worthy action, she is creditworthy for doing the right thing. If 
an agent merely accidentally does the right thing, she is not creditworthy for doing the right thing. 
This makes it clear that if an agent performs a morally worthy action, she can’t have merely accidentally 
done the right thing. Some form of non-accidentality condition is endorsed by nearly everyone in the 
debate over moral worth. The most obvious cases of accidentally doing the right thing are those in 
which someone does the right thing but is in no sense motivated by moral considerations. A classic 
example is Kant’s prudent shopkeeper, who prices his goods fairly for the reason that doing so will 
increase his profits. The shopkeeper’s action is morally right, but lacks moral worth because he is 
motivated by self-interest, not anything having to do with morality. In an important sense, it’s a mere 
accident that he does the right thing. 
As Kant puts it in the Groundwork, the prudent shopkeeper’s actions lack moral worth because 
their connection to the moral law is “only very contingent and precarious” (4:390). But Kant’s remark 
is potentially misleading, since the language of contingency and precariousness suggests that the 
relevant sense of non-accidentality is a kind of modal stability. This can’t be right, for even if 




wouldn’t suffice for moral worth. This is why it’s crucial to stress that what’s really behind the non-
accidentality condition is a point about creditworthiness. The sense of non-accidentality we’re 
interested in here is the sense in which the appropriate connection obtains between the rightness of 
an action and its agent’s motivation such that the agent is creditworthy for doing the right thing. And 
that connection is not a modal one.52 
In order to understand moral worth, we must understand what this connection is, and what 
kind of motivation can secure it. The literature on moral worth often characterizes this motivation 
simply as motivation that reflects well on the agent.53 But in light of the above, it’s clear that the 
requisite motivation can’t be just any such motivation. There are lots of motivations that reflect well 
on agents, but do nothing to secure non-accidentality.  For example, consider the following case: 
Promise. Dora’s motivation to attend the concert is that she believes the proceeds 
will go to charity. Actually, this is not the case – she was given misleading evidence. 
She has also forgotten that she promised a friend that she would go, making attending 
the concert the right thing to do. When she shows up at the concert, she discovers 
with dismay that the proceeds will not go to charity. However, upon seeing her friend, 
she remembers her promise and realizes that she has accidentally kept it.54 
Dora’s motivation to attend the concert reflects well on her, as beneficent motives usually do. But as 
it turns out, her motivation has nothing to do with the rightness of her action. Despite Dora’s 
motivation reflecting well on her, this is still a case of accidentally doing the right thing. Importantly, 
 
52 For further argument against modal conditions on moral worth, see Dishaw (ms). See also Faraci (forthcoming) for an 
argument against modal conceptions of non-accidentality in the epistemic domain.  
53 See, e.g., Arpaly (2002, p. 224) and Markovits (2010, p. 203).   




it’s not that Dora doesn’t deserve credit for anything in this case; rather, it’s that she doesn’t deserve 
credit for the rightness of her action per se.55 
Promise demonstrates that morally worthy action is not just right action that is laudably 
motivated. Rather, it’s action where the agent deserves credit for doing the right thing – that is, the agent 
must be creditworthy for the rightness of her action, not just for being laudably motivated. This 
connection between motivation and the rightness of action is the kind of non-accidentality that’s 
necessary for moral worth. it doesn’t settle what kind of motivation secures this connection. The 
Right-Making Features View and Rightness Itself View offer competing answers. However, neither of 
them offers an answer that secures the right kind of connection. In the next two sections, I’ll illustrate 
the insufficiency of both views by giving examples of right action where the requisite motivation is 
present, but the agent nevertheless accidentally does the right thing.  
 
3. The Right-Making Features View 
According to the Right-Making Features View (hereafter RMF), morally worthy action is 
motivated by features of the action that make it right. Defenders of this view include Nomy Arpaly 
(2002) and Julia Markovits (2010). Both Arpaly and Markovits put things in terms of acting for moral 
reasons, where moral reasons are understood as the right-making features of actions. As Arpaly puts 
it, morally worthy action consists in responsiveness to moral reasons. As Markovits puts it, it consists 
in a match between the agents’ motivating reasons and her moral reasons. So, for defenders of RMF, 
the contents of worth-conferring motivations are right-making features of those actions. This correctly 
 
55 We might say that Dora’s action is accidentally right in much the same way a Gettierized belief is accidentally true. In 




excludes obvious counterexamples like Kant’s self-interested shopkeeper because, although it’s right 
for him to price his goods fairly, that it will increase his profits is not what makes it right.  
There’s also considerable intuitive pull to two ideas behind RMF. One is that morally worthy 
actions are performed on the basis of moral reasons – considerations that count in favor of them, 
morally speaking. The other is that right-making features are paradigmatic examples of moral reasons. 
In fact, on some views of normative reasons more generally, normative reasons for actions are just 
those facts that ground the overall deontic statuses of those actions.56 
Arpaly and Markovits both claim that RMF satisfies the non-accidentality condition.57 For 
both of them, morally worthy action is motivated by considerations that in fact make the action right, 
whether or not the agent conceives of them as such. So, morally worthy action consists essentially in 
acting for (motivating) reasons that are moral reasons. There’s some sense in which actions so 
motivated are not merely accidentally right. However, it’s not at all clear that they’re non-accidentally 
right in the sense that entails that the agent is morally creditworthy for their rightness. This is because 
matches between the agent’s motivating reasons and moral reasons can themselves be accidental. 
This much is suggested by the unfortunately telling name of Markovits’ thesis: The Coincident 
Reasons Principle. This principle says “my action is morally worthy if and only if my motivating 
reasons for acting coincide with the reasons morally justifying the action” (p. 205). Ironically, 
Markovits’ use of the language of coincidence brings out precisely how RMF leaves room for an 
objectionable form of accidentality. If, through mere coincidence, the reasons for which I act just 
happen to be features of the action that make it right, I don’t deserve credit for the rightness of my 
action. In the relevant sense, I merely accidentally do the right thing.  
 
56 See, e.g., Broome (2013).  




Here’s how to generate a case where someone acts on the basis of right-making features, but 
isn’t creditworthy for doing the right thing: imagine someone who does the right thing on the basis of 
its right-making features, but has no idea that they are the right-making features, nor any particular 
concern for whether they are. Though such an agent happens to act on the basis of considerations 
that make the action right, his motivations are no more creditworthiness-conferring than those of the 
self-interested shopkeeper. 
At this point, a clarification is in order. For RMF to have any plausibility, not just anything 
that plays a role in grounding the rightness of an action can count as a ‘right-making feature’ for the 
purposes of the view. Otherwise, we could get cases where the agent is motivated by some feature of 
her action that has no intrinsic moral significance, but just happens to be a partial ground of the 
action’s rightness in a particular case. For example, even defenders of RMF would want to formulate 
their view to rule out the following as a case of morally worthy action:  
Venom. Jack, a surgeon, is hiking when he sees a stranger get bitten by a venomous 
snake and faint. He immediately makes an incision near the bite so that the venom will 
drain out. Making the incision is the right thing to do, and Jack’s reason for doing it 
(that it will allow the venom to drain out) is part of what makes it right. But Jack 
doesn’t have any particular concern for doing the right thing in this case, nor does he 
conceive of his reason as one that makes his action right. He is simply intrinsically 
interested in draining venom out of wounds.58 
 
The fact that it will allow the venom to drain out is a partial ground of the rightness of Jack’s action. 
But it surely cannot count as a right-making feature in the relevant sense. This is worth clarifying 
because it isn’t made obvious by Arpaly’s and Markovits’ formulations of RMF. However, Arpaly does 
address this issue in later work.59 
 
58 In an earlier version of this chapter, I used Venom as a counterexample to RMF. As several people who read that 
version pointed out, while Venom may be a counterexample to the letter of extant formulations of RMF, it’s not a 
counterexample to the spirit of the view.  




On the assumption that defenders of RMF can draw some kind of distinction between right-
makers that are intrinsically morally significant and those that are not, they can at least rule out Jack’s 
motivation in Venom as conferring moral worth. But what about cases where someone is intrinsically 
interested in something intrinsically morally significant, yet fails to conceive of it as such? For example, 
imagine that Jack’s fundamental motivating reason for making the incision is that it will save the 
stranger’s life (call this Venom*). But this is not because he sees anything particularly morally 
significant about saving lives. He has no concern for doing the right thing. Rather, he is simply 
intrinsically interested in saving lives in the same way he was intrinsically interested in draining venom 
in Venom.  
Admittedly, Venom* doesn’t elicit quite the same reaction as Venom. Acting from an intrinsic 
interest in draining venom strikes us as creepy, while acting from an intrinsic interest in saving lives 
does not. Crucially, however, the two cases are exactly morally equivalent from Jack’s own point of 
view: in both cases, from his perspective, there is nothing morally significant about what he’s doing. 
If Jack doesn’t see what motivates him as morally significant in either version of the case, why should 
it be to his credit in Venom* that what he’s motivated by just happens to be morally significant? The 
fact that the language of happenstance is no less apt in Venom* than in Venom suggests that this is 
still a case of accidentally doing the right thing. While (all else equal) we should prefer Jack’s motivation 
in Venom* to his motivation in Venom, we should also be skeptical that Jack deserves any more 
credit for doing the right thing per se in Venom* than he does in Venom.  
Though the two cases don’t elicit the same reaction, this can be fully explained by the fact that 
intrinsic interest in draining venom is off-putting in a way intrinsic interest in saving lives is not. If 
Jack is an amoralist in both cases, then surely his action lacks moral worth in both cases. After all, if 
anyone’s actions lack moral worth, it’s those of the amoralist. The amoralist doesn’t consider what 




features, his motivation by any particular consideration, whether or not it in fact happens to be morally 
significant, lacks the relevant connection to the rightness of his action.60  
Defenders of RMF might simply dig in their heels in response to Venom*. But we can further 
bring out RMF’s inadequacy by considering cases where there are multiple morally significant 
considerations at play. For example: 
Hard Truth. Anna has a choice: either tell her friend a hard truth, or lie and spare her 
feelings. Anna cares deeply and intrinsically about telling the truth, but not at all about 
sparing her friend’s feelings. So, without deliberating, she decides to tell her friend the 
hard truth. As it turns out, given the balance of moral reasons in this situation, this is 
the right thing to do.  
In this case, it turns out that telling her friend something painful to hear is the right thing to do, and 
what makes it right is that it’s the truth. Moreover, she tells her friend the hard truth for the reason 
that it’s the truth. Nevertheless, Anna doesn’t deserve credit for the rightness of her action. For while 
she does the right thing on the basis of a right-making feature, there is something strange about the 
fact that Anna has absolutely no interest in another clearly morally significant feature of the situation: 
that telling the truth will cause her friend significant emotional pain.  
What’s missing Anna’s case is a concern for doing what the balance of moral reasons favors. 
While it’s true that she ends up doing what’s favored by the balance of moral reasons, this plays no 
role in the explanation of her action. If it did, she would have weighed the moral importance of 
truthfulness against her friend’s well-being to figure out which choice was right. It’s precisely the 
absence of such weighing that prevents her from deserving credit for doing the right thing in this case. 
 
60 Johnson King (forthcoming a) argues on similar grounds that Huck Finn’s actions lack moral worth. As she and many 
others understand the case of Huck Finn, Huck just happens to be motivated by morally relevant considerations. However, 
I think there is a better interpretation of Huck’s psychology that makes sense of why his actions are intuitively morally 




This looks like another case of accidentally doing the right thing. But in this case, the accident 
is that Anna’s action just happened to be what the balance of morally reasons favored, despite her 
only being interested in one kind of morally relevant consideration. By contrast, if she were to weigh 
the morally significant considerations and then, having come to the correct conclusion, perform the 
very same action, that action might have moral worth. But as it stands, despite satisfying RMF’s 
conditions, this doesn’t look like a case of morally worthy action. Of course, it can’t be the case that 
actions lack moral worth unless the agent weighs every single morally relevant consideration. If an 
agent fails to take into account very weak and/or massively outweighed considerations, her action can 
still be morally worthy. Nevertheless, it’s clear that morally worthy action requires enough concern for 
doing what the balance of moral reasons favors that the agent will thereby take into account a wide 
range of weighty moral reasons.    
The cases I’ve discussed in this section show that RMF leaves room for cases in which 
someone acts rightly on the basis of right-making features, but nevertheless fails to be creditworthy 
for doing the right thing. As such, RMF fails to guarantee the kind of non-accidentality required for 
moral worth.  
 
4. The Rightness Itself View 
According to the Rightness Itself View (hereafter RI), morally worthy action is motivated by 
rightness itself. Defenders of this view include Paulina Sliwa (2016) and Zoe Johnson King 
(forthcoming a). Different versions of the view differ on the sufficient conditions for moral worth, 
but all of them agree that motivation by rightness itself is a necessary condition. Furthermore, they all 
agree that motivation by right-making features is not a necessary condition for moral worth.  
RI holds that the content of worth-conferring motivations is exclusively the rightness of the 




content must be exclusively either right-making features or rightness itself. Also like RMF, RI 
successfully rules out obvious counterexamples involving selfish motivation to do the right thing. The 
self-interested shopkeeper’s actions lack moral worth because though it’s right for him to price his 
goods fairly, he isn’t at all motivated to do so by the consideration that it’s right. RI also makes sense 
of something that RMF struggles with. In the cases discussed in §3, part of what was missing was a 
kind of concern on the part of the agent for whether she was actually doing the right thing. RI captures 
the importance of this kind of concern by requiring that agents care about the rightness of their actions 
itself.61 Moreover, there’s considerable intuitive pull to the idea that when agents perform morally 
worthy actions, the rightness of the action must at least partially explain why they performed it.  
Defenders of RI take it to be uniquely well-placed to satisfy the non-accidentality condition. 
In the course of defending their respective versions of RI, both Sliwa and Johnson King argue that 
RMF cannot satisfy it. As a reminder, it seems to be a shared assumption in the debate between RMF 
and RI that the kind of motivation identified by each view is sufficient to secure non-accidentality. 
But even if Sliwa’s and Johnson King’s views secure non-accidentality, this can’t be in virtue of being 
versions of RI. This is because the kind of motivation identified by RI fails to secure non-accidentality.  
Consider a simple version of RI on which morally worthy action is simply right action 
motivated by the consideration that it’s right. This simple version of RI requires only a match between 
the rightness of the action and the content of the agent’s motivation. But this match can itself be 
merely accidental. To see this, consider cases where the agent is mistaken enough about the nature of 
moral rightness that the connection between the rightness of her action and her being motivated to 
 
61 Of course, some would see this as a vice of RI, not a virtue, because they take any form of so-called ‘de dicto moral 




perform is too tenuous for her to deserve moral credit, but not so mistaken that the property of 
rightness cannot figure in the content of her motivations. For example, consider the following case: 
Moving. Simon’s friend is in a tough spot and needs last minute help moving. Simon 
helps him, which is the right thing to do. And he’s motivated to do so by the 
consideration that it’s the right thing to do. According to Simon’s conception of 
morality, what’s right is what benefits one’s friends and harms one’s enemies. But the 
content of his motivation is simply that helping his friend is the right thing to do.  
In this case, Simon does the right thing, and he’s motivated by rightness itself in the sense that the 
content of his motivation is the consideration that his action is right. Nevertheless, due to his mistaken 
conception of morality, the connection between the content of Simon’s motivation and the rightness 
of his action is too tenuous for him to deserve credit for its rightness.  In the relevant sense, it’s a mere 
accident that his motivation by rightness (as he conceives of it) results in his doing the right thing.  
To further bring this out, it is worth noting that Moving can easily be modified into a version 
of Hard Truth that serves as a counterexample to RI. We can imagine a version of Moving in which 
there are other morally significant considerations that are outweighed, but which are not morally 
significant on Simon’s conception of morality. In such a scenario, just like Anna’s in Hard Truth, 
Simon’s motivation would fail to manifest sensitivity to the balance of moral reasons. This would 
introduce an objectionable form of accidentality. So, insofar as RI allows for Simon’ action to count 
as morally worthy in either version of Moving, it seems no less subject to counterexample than RMF.   
The simple version of RI therefore fails to secure non-accidentality. This makes it clear that 
what RI says about motivational content isn’t what does the work in satisfying the non-accidentality 
condition.62 Of course, neither Sliwa nor Johnson King endorses the simple version of RI. Each of 
them defends conditions for morally worthy action that outstrip RI. According to Sliwa, morally 
 
62 Sliwa herself recognizes this when she gives the example of “a bureaucrat like Eichmann, who seems to care about doing 
what’s right but has a deeply misguided conception of what morality requires: he believes that doing what’s right requires 




worthy action must be motivated by moral knowledge. According to Johnson King, morally worthy 
action must be an instance of deliberately doing the right thing. Both Sliwa and Johnson King write 
as if their respective conditions are compatible only with what RI says about motivational content, 
which explains why they take RI to be uniquely placed to secure non-accidentality. I think this is a 
mistake. Nothing either of them says establishes any necessary connection between RI and moral 
knowledge or deliberateness. Instead, they each seem to argue against RMF on the grounds that it fails 
to satisfy the non-accidentality condition, then argue that their souped-up versions of RI succeed at 
satisfying it. But neither considers whether similar machinery is available to RMF.  
First, consider moral knowledge. Sliwa’s full view is that “[a] morally right action has moral 
worth if and only if it is motivated by concern for doing what’s right (conative requirement) and by 
knowledge that it is the right thing to do (knowledge requirement)” (p. 394). She then argues that the 
knowledge requirement secures non-accidentality. But why couldn’t defenders of RMF appeal to 
similar machinery? They could argue that a right action has moral worth if and only if it is motivated 
by (a) its right-making features, and (b) knowledge of their status as right-making features. It’s not 
clear that this version of RMF would fare any worse than Sliwa’s version of RI.  
Now consider deliberateness. Johnson King’s full view is that “[a]n act has moral worth just 
in case it is an instance of someone’s deliberately doing the right thing” (p. 16). As she notes, “The 
terms ‘deliberate’ and ‘accidental’ are antonyms, and the categories to which they refer are logical 
contraries; if someone does something deliberately, then she does not do it accidentally, and vice 
versa” (pp. 16-17). This makes it trivially true that her view satisfies the non-accidentality condition.  
Johnson King takes her view to be a version of RI. So, she must think that deliberately doing 
the right thing consists uniquely in being motivated by rightness itself. If she were to show this, she 
would thereby show that non-accidentality is connected to motivation by rightness itself and that RI 




defend any particular account of deliberateness. This leaves it no clearer that deliberateness is uniquely 
connected to motivation by rightness itself than it was at the outset that non-accidentality is uniquely 
connected to motivation by rightness itself.  
The present point is not about the merits of Sliwa’s or Johnson King’s accounts (I’ll return to 
that subject in §6.1). Rather, it’s this: the dialectic presupposes that motivational content provides the 
connection to rightness that satisfies the non-accidentality condition. In the context of this dialectic, 
our aim should be to figure out what motivational content could secure non-accidentality. This isn’t 
an aim we can achieve by positing conditions that are independent of motivational content. Moreover, 
regardless of the dialectic, positing such conditions doesn’t help us answer what is independently a 
very important question about moral worth: what kind of motivation confers moral worth on an 
action? Each view claims that one motivational content exclusively confers moral worth. According 
to RMF, it’s right-making features. According to RI, it’s rightness itself.  
What I hope to have shown so far is that neither content by itself secures non-accidentality. 
As such, we should reject the assumption in the debate that the right kind of motivation consists 
exclusively in either motivation by right-making features, or motivation by rightness itself. The failure 
of each of these options to provide a motivational structure that secures non-accidentality shows that 
this central assumption gives rise to a false dilemma. In the following section, I’ll discard this 
assumption and develop an alternative, intermediary view.  
 
5. The Guise of Moral Reasons 
Despite my criticisms of RMF and RI, I don’t want to pretend that they haven’t gotten 
anything right. In fact, both offer important insights about the nature of morally worthy action. I’ll 




The central insight of RMF is that morally worthy actions are performed on the basis of moral 
reasons – considerations that count in favor of them, morally speaking. In the clearest cases of morally 
worthy action, the agent appreciates what the balance of moral reasons favors, and does the right thing 
on the basis of those reasons. So, it seems right to hold that moral reasons, insofar as they serve as 
bases for morally worthy actions, are part of the content of worth-conferring motivations.  RMF gets 
this much right. But as shown in §3, it makes two mistakes. The first is thinking that these 
considerations are the whole of the content of such motivation. Relatedly, the second is thinking that 
the relevant kind of responsiveness to moral reasons can occur without the agent conceiving of them 
as such, or having any particular concern for their moral significance.  
The central insight of RI, on the other hand, is that that morally worthy actions must be done 
out of concern for doing the right thing. Absent any kind of concern for whether their actions are 
right, agents simply don’t deserve credit for doing the right thing per se, though their motivations might 
be otherwise laudable. Furthermore, in cases where there are multiple morally relevant considerations, 
the agent must appreciate the balance of such reasons and act accordingly for her action to have moral 
worth. It’s difficult to make sense of how agents would be able to do this without weighing such 
considerations with regard to their moral significance. Some kind of concern for doing the right thing 
seems like a precondition for even engaging in moral deliberation.63 
RI gets all of this right. But as §4 highlighted, concern for doing the right thing also can’t be 
the entirety of the relevant motivational content. Besides, it’s not at all clear that concern for doing 
the right thing ordinarily plays the same motivational role that right-making features do. I’ve suggested 
that concern for doing the right thing is what makes it possible for us to weigh and balance moral 
 
63 As such, I disagree with Arpaly (2015), who claims that moral deliberation doesn’t require any concern for doing the 




reasons with regard to their moral significance. But if this is the role that concern for doing the right 
thing plays, then it’s a mistake to think that motivation by rightness itself is a competitor to motivation 
by right-making features. Instead, the former is a precondition of the latter’s proper functioning.  
The above point is of utmost importance, because it provides strong positive justification for 
exploring a motivational structure that has both right-making features and rightness itself as contents. 
If motivation by moral reasons and motivation by concern for doing the right thing are not only 
compatible, but necessary for each other’s proper functioning, then the central insights of the two 
views can and should be combined. This is precisely what I’ll do in formulating my own account. 
Much of what I’ve argued so far suggests that morally worthy action requires motivation both by 
moral reasons and concern for doing the right thing.64 I’ve also shown that these two contents need 
to be related to each other in the right way. So, a simple conjunctive view won’t do.65 Instead, we need 
a view on which the agent is motivated by moral reasons in virtue of her concern for doing the right 
thing. As I’ll argue, such a structure is secured by a view on which the agent is motivated by moral 
reasons as such. Here’s a brief statement of my account: 
The Guise of Moral Reasons Account: A right action has moral worth if and only 
if the agent performs it on the basis of sufficient moral reasons as such.  
This requires some unpacking. What is it to be motivated by sufficient moral reasons as such? First, the 
agent must be motivated by sufficient moral reasons. Moral reasons are sufficient when they favor an 
action strongly enough to make it the case that the balance of moral reasons favors it. In other words, 
 
64 Toppinen (forthcoming) argues that this sort of view runs into problems unless we reject cognitivism about moral 
thought. However, his argument seems to rely on the assumption that both contents would need to play the role of 
motivating reasons. Since I reject this assumption, my account sidesteps the issue raised by Toppinen.  
65 Though I don’t have space to discuss this in detail, neither will a view involving primary and secondary motives, where 
secondary motives are limiting conditions that are activated only in cases where the agent’s primary motives would lead to 




moral reasons are sufficient when they favor an action strongly enough to make it right.  The language 
of sufficiency is important here because doing the right thing on the basis of insufficient moral reasons 
is a way of accidentally doing the right thing. For if the reasons for which the agent acted were the 
only moral reasons for her action, that action would have failed to be right.  
Now we can tackle the ‘as such’ clause. This clause says that in order for an action to be 
morally worthy, the agent must not only act rightly on the basis of sufficient moral reasons, but act 
on the basis of those reasons under the guise of their being sufficient to make her action right. 
Importantly, to act for some reason under the guise of a moral reason is not simply to act on the basis 
of that reason and also to believe it to be a moral reason. Rather, to act for some reason under the 
guise of a moral reason is to be motivated by that reason in virtue of taking it to contribute to the 
overall moral status of the action. This is what it is to act for a moral reason as such.66,67 
Furthermore, in order to act on the basis of sufficient moral reasons as such, the agent must be 
motivated by these reasons in virtue of taking them to be sufficient – i.e. in virtue of taking them to 
favor the action strongly enough to make it the case that the balance of moral reasons favors it. This 
requires a kind of concern for what the balance of moral reasons favors. For without such a concern, 
an agent could not be motivated by some set of reasons in virtue of taking it to be sufficient to make 
it right. It may be helpful to think of the agent’s being motivated by moral reasons in virtue of attempting 
to do the right thing. If I’m attempting to perform an action with a certain property, I must have some 
 
66 Acting for a moral reason as such thus entails that the agent is not motivated by the reason solely in virtue of taking it to 
favor the action in some other, nonmoral way – e.g. prudentially. So, my account correctly rules out the kind of 
instrumental motivation by moral reasons discussed by Markovits (2010). 
67 It might be objected that the reason’s connection to the moral status of the action need not figure into the content of 
the agent’s motivation, because non-accidentally doing the right thing only requires manifesting a more general disposition 
to act on the basis of sufficient moral reasons. For examples of this sort of view, see Lord (2017) and Way (2018). I 
disagree with such views on the grounds that manifesting dispositions is insufficient for creditworthiness. For an argument 




concern for whether my action actually has that property. So, if I’m attempting to do the right thing, 
I must have some concern for what the balance of moral reasons favors – in other words, for what is 
morally right.  
The motivational state identified by the Guise of Moral Reasons account thus includes both 
motivation by moral reasons and concern for doing the right thing. The former content captures the 
central insight of RMF: that morally worthy actions are performed on the basis of moral reasons. The 
latter content captures the central insight of RI: that morally worthy actions must be done out of 
concern for doing the right thing. But this latter content isn’t itself a motivating reason. Instead, it’s 
the guise under which the agent is motivated by her motivating reasons. Concern for doing the right 
thing thereby plays the role of guiding the agent’s motivating reasons rather than being a motivating 
reason itself.  
My account captures the central insights of both RMF and RI by making room in worth-
conferring motivation for both of the contents they identify. In doing so, it provides the necessary 
resources to make sense of things that RMF and RI struggle with. One thing RMF struggles to make 
sense of is why actions lack moral worth when agents are only concerned with one of many morally 
relevant considerations. And while RI can explain how moral deliberation is possible, it also doesn’t 
explain the importance of weighing and balancing different morally relevant considerations. If the 
consideration that an act is right plays the role of the agent’s motivating reason instead of the higher-
level guiding role I’ve suggested it should, it looks like she too fails to act out of concern for what the 
balance of moral reasons favors. My account makes sense of this. If someone is only concerned with 
one of many morally relevant considerations, she fails to count as acting for sufficient moral reasons 
as such.  
The Guise of Moral Reasons account sits between the extremes of the two views that have 




the sole content of worth-conferring motivations. But neither kind of content is sufficient. The Guise 
of Moral Reasons account solves this by carving out motivational roles for both kinds of content. The 
rightness of the action itself plays a motivational role by guiding the agent’s motivating reasons, while 
the moral reasons that favor it play a role by constituting the agent’s motivating reasons. In this way, 
the agent of a morally worthy action is motivated both by what makes the action right and the action’s 
rightness itself.  
This motivational structure gives the Guise of Moral Reasons account the resources to satisfy 
the non-accidentality condition. Here’s how it deals with all of my counterexamples to RMF and RI. 
In cases like Venom and Venom*, the agent isn’t motivated by sufficient moral reasons as such, 
because he doesn’t act under the guise of moral reasons at all. In cases like Hard Truth, the agent 
isn’t motivated by sufficient moral reasons as such, because she lacks overall concern for what the 
balance of moral reasons favors. Finally, in cases like Moving, the agent isn’t motivated by sufficient 
moral reasons at all; moreover, the rightness of his action plays the wrong role in his motivational 
structure.68 
Unlike RMF and RI, the Guise of Moral Reasons account doesn’t leave room for cases of 
accidentally doing the right thing. This is because in requiring that the agent be motivated by sufficient 
moral reasons under that very guise, it requires the agent’s motivational structure to more closely 
mirror normative reality. The agent’s concern for acting rightly mirrors the rightness of her action. 
The reasons for which she acts mirror the moral reasons that count in favor of it. And finally, the 
explanatory connection between her concern for acting rightly and the motivating force of moral 
 
68 It might be objected that the fact that an action is right is a sufficient moral reason to perform that action. While this 
kind of view is often taken to lead to a variety of problems, Johnson King (forthcoming b) gives a plausible defense of it. 
I don’t have the space to fully address such an objection here, but my response is basically that any way of being motivated 
by such a consideration that could confer moral worth would collapse into the kind of motivational structure identified by 




reasons under that guise mirrors the explanatory connection between the rightness of her action and 
the moral reasons that favor it.  
While this is a more complex motivational structure, I don’t think this is a problem for the 
Guise of Moral Reasons account. Human motivation is complex, and we are constantly motivated in 
sophisticated ways. As such, there’s nothing unrealistic about the idea that how we conceive of our 
actions plays a guiding role in which considerations motivate us to act. Less realistic are the kinds of 
simplistic motivation that RMF and RI take to be sufficient for morally worthy action. This explains 
why the counterexamples to these views involve characters with such odd psychologies. It’s simply 
very strange that anyone would care only about whether an action is right, and not about the reasons 
why, or vice versa. By contrast, ordinary cases of moral motivation plausibly involve exactly the kind 
of complex structure I’ve identified. The complexity of the Guise of Moral Reasons account only 
makes it more plausible.   
 
6. Loose Ends 
In this section, I’ll attempt to tie up some loose ends about moral worth. First, I’ll reconsider 
the details of Sliwa’s and Johnson King’s views in light of the Guise of Moral Reasons account. Then, 
I’ll discuss what my account says about moral fetishism and the oft-discussed case of Huck Finn.  
6.1. Moral Knowledge and Deliberateness 
In §4, I temporarily set aside the details of Sliwa’s and Johnson King’s views in order to 
consider a simple version of RI. These details deserve further consideration. In particular, one might 
wonder what my account has to say about conditions on moral worth involving moral knowledge or 
deliberateness.  
On Sliwa’s account, morally worthy actions are motivated by knowledge that what we are 




such. Does this require knowledge that what we are doing is right? Much depends on how we 
understand the knowledge condition. As Sliwa understands it, this condition “crucially relies on the 
assumption that knowledge is a mental state that can play a causal role in producing actions” (p. 395). 
Because this is a controversial assumption that Sliwa doesn’t defend, it seems preferable not to have 
to take it on.  
Furthermore, there is a separate issue with Sliwa’s knowledge condition on the basis of which 
Johnson King rejects it. Johnson King’s argument is roughly as follows. In order to have knowledge 
that the action we’re performing is right, we need to know that it’s the action we’re performing. In 
cases where we successfully attempt to do something right, but where our success was highly 
uncertain, our actions can have moral worth despite our not knowing we were doing the right thing. 
If Johnson King is right about this, then we don’t need to know that what we’re doing is right for our 
actions to have moral worth.69 
On Johnson King’s account, an action is morally worthy if and only if the agent deliberately 
does the right thing. And as she notes, deliberateness and accidentality are contraries. If morally worthy 
action is non-accidentally right action, then of course her account must be correct. However, it’s a 
mistake to think that deliberately doing the right thing consists partly in being motivated by the reason 
that the action is right. As I argued in §5, if a right action is motivated by sufficient moral reasons as 
such, this guarantees non-accidentality. Thus, it must also guarantee deliberateness.  
Johnson King also says that “that the best way to develop this [deliberateness-based] view is 
to take the performance of an act with moral worth to be a kind of achievement: the achievement of 
someone’s trying to act rightly and succeeding” (p. 16). The Guise of Moral Reasons account makes 
 
69 Of course, one might think that in cases of uncertainty, the right thing to do just is to try the best we can. If we accept 
this view, then the idea that we must know that what we’re doing is right becomes more plausible, because we can know 




good sense of this. To try to act rightly and succeed just is to do the right thing in virtue of being 
motivated by sufficient moral reasons as such. So, there is ultimately not much on which Johnson 
King and I disagree. Our only real point of disagreement is that she takes the deliberateness condition 
to entail RI, whereas I take it to be simply a restatement of the non-accidentality condition and so not 
by itself informative about the nature of worth-conferring motivation.  
6.2. Moral Fetishism 
A charge often levelled against RI is that motivation by rightness itself is a kind of ‘moral 
fetishism.’70 Since motivation by rightness itself plays a role in the Guise of Moral Reasons account, 
does this mean it inherits the moral fetishism objection from RI? No. While there’s something to the 
moral fetishism objection, its significance is highly exaggerated. Moral fetishism is supposed to consist 
in a kind of monomaniacal obsession with doing the right thing, or a narrow-minded focus on the 
rightness of actions instead of the features that make them right. Insofar as RI allows for such 
motivational structures to be worth-conferring, this does look like a problem for RI.  
However, the moral fetishism objection is often posed as an objection to any motivation by 
rightness itself. This is a mistake. As Sigrún Svavarsdóttir puts it, “a concern for being moral should 
not be confused with a rigorous obsession with morality or a resistance to examine hard reflective 
questions about morality” (1999, p. 200). If someone cares only about whether her actions are right, 
and not at all about why, that does seem strangely fetishistic. But one can be concerned with rightness 
itself without such concern manifesting itself so monomaniacally.71 
On the Guise of Moral Reasons account, concern for rightness itself is only one part of worth-
conferring motivation. Agents who perform morally worthy actions are motivated by a range of 
 
70 This objection to RI originally comes from Smith (1994).  




morally relevant considerations in virtue of taking them to be morally relevant. There’s nothing 
narrow-minded or monomaniacal about concern for rightness itself playing this guiding role. So, 
there’s nothing fetishistic about the kind of moral motivation required by the Guise of Moral Reasons 
Account.  It’s also worth reiterating that the motivational structure required by the Guise of Moral 
Reasons account looks generally like the less odd form of moral motivation. It’s utterly ordinary for 
agents to be concerned with doing the right thing, and to express this concern by acting on the basis 
of what they take to be morally relevant considerations. By contrast, either a singular focus on 
rightness itself or a singular focus on right-making features (conceived of apart from their connection 
to rightness) should strike us as both fetishistic and psychologically abnormal.    
6.3. Huck Finn 
One of the most central cases in the literature on moral worth has been the case of Huck 
Finn.72 Now that the Guise of Moral Reasons account is on the table, it’s worth looking at what it says 
about whether Huck’s action has moral worth. The action in question is helping Jim, a fugitive slave, 
escape. This is obviously the right thing to do. But because Huck believes Jim is the rightful property 
of Miss Watson, he believes he’s acting wrongly by helping Jim escape. According to Arpaly and 
Markovits, Huck’s action nevertheless has moral worth, making it a counterexample to RI. They 
interpret Huck as acting on the basis of the right-making features of his action, without conceiving of 
them as such, or of his action as right, in any way. As Arpaly puts it, “He does not have the belief that 
what he does is right anywhere in his head – this moral insight is exactly what eludes him” (2002, p. 
229). Nevertheless, because implicitly recognizes Jim’s personhood, he acts on the basis of a right-
making feature.  
 
72 This case originally appears in Twain (1884). It was introduced into discussions of moral worth by Bennett (1974), and 




Both Sliwa and Johnson King argue that if this is really Huck’s psychology, his action lacks 
moral worth because he merely accidentally does the right thing. I agree with this conditional verdict; 
the way Huck’s psychology is interpreted in the debate, it’s close enough to Jack’s in Venom and 
Venom* that it’s a counterexample to RMF. On the Guise of Moral Reasons account, Huck’s action 
would lack moral worth because although he acts for a sufficient moral reason, he fails to act for that 
reason as a moral reason. Nevertheless, there’s quite a bit of intuitive pull to the idea that Huck’s 
action has moral worth. Does this mean that the Guise of Moral Reasons account has counterintuitive 
results in this case? No. because the debate operates with an overly simplistic interpretation of Huck’s 
psychology. As such, when we make intuitive judgments about the case, we implicitly fill in Huck’s 
psychology to make it more plausible, which prevents our intuitions from being probative. Given a 
more plausible reconstruction of Huck’s psychology, my account is well-placed to explain why his 
action is morally worthy.  
Arpaly and Markovits interpret Huck as implicitly recognizing Jim’s personhood, and acting 
on the basis of this right-making feature. But because they insist that Huck doesn’t recognize this 
right-making feature as such, they leave it completely inexplicable why Huck is motivated by 
considerations of Jim’s personhood. In doing so, they make Huck into a kind of personhood fetishist, 
whose psychology seems no less strange than that of the oft-derided moral fetishist. By contrast, I 
think the best explanation of why Huck is motivated by considerations of Jim’s personhood is that he 
tacitly takes them to be morally significant. If he can tacitly recognize Jim’s personhood, why not think 
he also tacitly recognizes it as a moral reason, and is motivated by it in virtue of this recognition? My 
suggestion is that Huck, in deciding to help Jim, makes what Alex Worsnip (2017) calls a 




by the agent who makes it as non-normative (either generally or in some particular respect), but that 
is in fact normative (either generally or in that particular respect)” (p. 3).73 
Unlike the amoralist, Huck clearly cares about doing the right thing. We should be wary of 
completely divorcing this general concern from his motivation to help Jim. Despite the fact that he 
doesn’t explicitly present himself in this way, I think we should interpret Huck as motivated by 
considerations of Jim’s personhood in virtue of tacitly taking them to constitute sufficient moral 
reason to help him. If we interpret his motivational structure in this way, his action counts as morally 
worthy on the Guise of Moral Reasons account.  
This isn’t an ad hoc maneuver to save my account from counterexample, because my 
interpretation of Huck’s psychology is independently more plausible than the standard interpretation. 
As I’ve argued, motivation solely by right-making features (not conceived of as such) and motivation 
solely by rightness itself are each not only fetishistic, but fail to reflect the structure of ordinary moral 
motivation. If we give Huck the benefit of doubt that, despite how he presents his motivation to help 
Jim, it has the complex structure of ordinary moral motivation, then my account doesn’t just 
accommodate the verdict that Huck’s action has moral worth – it actually does a better job of 
explaining this verdict.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
Here’s what I’ve argued in this chapter. Neither of the two dominant views about moral worth 
delivers the kind of motivational structure necessary to satisfy the non-accidentality condition. This is 
 
73 Of course, I have not shown that this is the only plausible interpretation of Huck’s psychology. But I have provided 
some support for my suggestion that it is a more plausible interpretation than the received interpretation. Moreover, to 
show that my account doesn’t have counterintuitive results, I only need to show that my interpretation is at least as 




because it’s a mistake to assume that a simple motivational state (whether it be motivation by right-
making features or by rightness itself) can guarantee non-accidentality. Instead, morally worthy action 
requires a motivational structure in which both contents are present and related in the right way. I 
have offered an account that delivers such a structure. The Guise of Moral Reasons account holds 
that morally worthy action consists in right action motivated by sufficient moral reason as such. When 
an agent is motivated by sufficient moral reasons as such, she is motivated by moral reasons in virtue 
of recognizing that they favor an action strongly enough to make it the case that the balance of moral 
reasons favors it. The agent’s motivation by right-making features thereby expresses her concern for 
the action’s rightness itself. This satisfies the condition that when an agent’s action has moral worth, 
she deserves credit for acting rightly, because it is no accident that she has done the right thing. 
In virtue of acting on the basis of sufficient moral reasons as such, an agent counts as being 
guided by moral rightness through correct responsiveness to moral reasons. Thus, moral worth has 
the structure of a normative achievement. And we can draw a general lesson about normative 
achievements from this account of moral worth. The non-accidentality condition on moral worth is 
satisfied only when we act on the basis of moral reasons as such. Because normative achievements in 
general consist in non-accidental compliance with a normative standard, we have good reason to think 
that in general, normative achievements involve acting, thinking, and feeling on the basis of the right 
kinds of reasons as such. To correctly respond to moral reasons, we must respond them as moral 
reasons in particular. This is something over and above acting for a motivating reason that just 
happens to be a normative reason, for that would still allow for accidentality. So, correctly responding 
to reasons requires more specific kinds of representations of our reasons because to correctly respond 
to reasons in the sense that is required for normative achievement is to respond to reasons as the 




involved in normative achievements is a non-accidental form of success that is attributable to us as 




CHAPTER 3 REFERENCES 
 
 
Arpaly, Nomy (2002). Moral Worth. Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223-245. 
——— (2015). Huckleberry Finn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance". In 
Randolph Clarke Michael Mckenna & Angela M. Smith (eds.), The Nature of Moral 
Responsibility. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 141-156. 
Arpaly, Nomy & Schroeder, Timothy (2013). In Praise of Desire. Oxford University Press. 
Baron, Marcia (1995). Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. Cornell University Press. 
Bennett, Jonathan (1974). The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn. Philosophy 49(188): 123–
134. 
Broome, John (2013). Rationality Through Reasoning. Wiley-Blackwell.  
Dishaw, Samuel (ms). The Puzzle of Lucky Right Action. 
Faraci, David (2019). Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence. 
Philosophers' Imprint 19 (4).  
Herman, Barbara (1996). The Practice of Moral Judgment. Harvard University Press.  
Johnson King, Zoë (forthcoming a). Accidentally Doing the Right Thing. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. 
——— (forthcoming b). We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too. In Russ Shafer-Landau 
(ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 14. Oxford University Press.  
——— (ms). How To be a Moral Fetishist.  
Kant, Immanuel (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary Gregor and 
Jens Timmerman (2012). Cambridge University Press.  
Lord, Errol (2017). On the Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right 
Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 
(2):436-464. 
Markovits, Julia (2010). Acting for the right reasons. The Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242. 
Singh, Keshav (forthcoming). Moral Worth, Credit, and Non-Accidentality. Oxford Studies in 
Normative Ethics (vol. 10).  
Sliwa, Paulina (2016). Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological 




Smith, Michael (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell. 
Stratton-Lake, Philip (2000). Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth. Routledge. 
Svavarsdóttir, Sigrún (1999). Moral cognitivism and motivation. Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219. 
Toppinen, Teemu (forthcoming). From Duty for the Right Reasons. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford 
Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 9. Oxford University Press. 
Twain, Mark (1884). The adventures of Huckleberry Finn (Tom Sawyer's comrade) by Mark Twain. New York 
& London. 
Way, Jonathan (2018). Creditworthiness and Matching Principles. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford 
Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press.  













As rational agents, we are subject to the demands of normative reasons – considerations that 
count in favor of (or against) actions we might perform, as well as beliefs, intentions, and other 
attitudes we might hold. Furthermore, for us to be good agents, it isn’t enough that our actions and 
attitudes merely comply with what our reasons require. Rather, we must actually (and correctly) respond 
to those reasons in acting, believing, feeling (etc.) as we do. When we comply with a standard in virtue 
of correctly responding to the reasons that bear on it, we are thereby guided by that standard. This is 
what I have called a normative achievement.  
Correctly responding to normative reasons is a phenomenon of utmost importance with 
regard to normative achievement. In this chapter, I will be particularly concerned with the achievement 
of rationality.74 According to an increasingly influential family of views, rationality is a matter of 
correctly responding to one’s reasons.75 On such views, for any potentially rational action or attitude, 
there is a set of normative reasons – call them rationalizing reasons – such that when our actions and 
attitudes correctly respond to those reasons, that action or attitude is thereby rational.  
 
74 Philosophers have also offered reasons-responsiveness accounts of other achievements, such as morally worthy action. 
See, for example, Arpaly (2000) and Markovits (2010). I have already defended a similar account of moral worth in Chapter 
3.   




Call such theories reasons-responsiveness theories of rationality. I think some version of a 
reasons-responsiveness theory is true. However, there’s a serious problem with many extant versions: 
they rely on accounts of correctly responding to reasons that cannot explain a central feature of 
rationality. In acting or holding attitudes rationally, agents are creditworthy for successfully acting or 
holding attitudes in accordance with their reasons. If rationality consists in correctly responding to 
reasons, then correct responsiveness to reasons must be able to explain this central feature of 
rationality. In other words, we must have an account of correctly responding to reasons that explains 
how rationality is a normative achievement.  
My goal in this chapter is to develop an account of correctly responding to reasons that shows 
how rationality is a normative achievement. Along the way, I will aim to shed some light on the general 
structure of normative achievement by shedding light on what it is to correctly respond to reasons. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin in §2 by providing broad characterizations of rationality and 
correctly responding to reasons. In §3, I consider an account of correctly responding to reasons 
according to which it is a matter of manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions. In §4, I argue that if 
rationality consists in correctly responding to reasons, this dispositional account cannot succeed. In 
§5, I sketch my own account of correctly responding to reasons, according to which correctly 
responding to reasons requires representing those reasons as the reasons they are. In §6, I draw out 
two significant implications of my account for the theory of rationality. Finally, I conclude in §7 with 
some brief remarks about rationality and normative achievement.  
 
2. Preliminaries 
Before getting into the more substantial discussion that will occupy the rest of the chapter, it 




provide characterizations of both rationality and correctly responding to reasons that can be agreed 
upon by everyone who is sympathetic to the reasons-responsiveness approach.   
2.1. Rationality 
The term ‘rationality’ gets used in different ways. Sometimes, it’s used to refer to a property 
that sets of actions and/or attitudes have when they hang together in the right way. This sense of 
rationality is usually called structural rationality, or coherence. This is not the sense of rationality that 
reasons-responsiveness theories of rationality are in the first instance concerned with. Reasons-
responsiveness theories are in the first instance concerned with what is often called substantive 
rationality.76  
Unlike structural rationality, substantive rationality isn’t characterized as a property that a set 
of actions and/or attitudes has when it meets certain structural criteria (criteria regarding the relations 
between its members). Instead, it’s characterized as a property that a single action or attitude has when 
it meets certain substantive criteria – that is, criteria about what particular actions or attitudes are called 
for given the agent’s normative situation.  
While reasons-responsiveness theorists are in the first instance concerned with substantive 
rationality, they’re not necessarily silent about structural rationality. For example, Benjamin 
Kiesewetter (2017) and Errol Lord (2018) have both argued that structural rationality is reducible to 
 
76 The terminology of structural and substantive rationality has its roots in Scanlon, who distinguishes “structural claims 
about rationality” from “substantive claims about what is a reason for what” (2003, p. 84). Scanlon (2003) doesn’t frame the 
distinction as a one between two kinds of rationality, but Scanlon (2007) comes close to framing it this way. It has since 




substantive rationality.77,78 Alex Worsnip (2018), on the other hand, argues that the two can come into 
conflict, which suggests that neither is reducible to the other.79 I’ll attempt to stay neutral in such 
debates. All I want to commit to here is that there is such a thing as substantive rationality, and it is 
the analysans of reasons-responsiveness theories. Since I’ll be setting structural rationality aside for 
the rest of the chapter, I’ll hereafter refer to substantive rationality simply as ‘rationality.’  
As several theorists have noted, rationality is a property that seems to be intimately tied to 
credit and criticism. Attributions of rationality and irrationality are by their nature ways of crediting 
and criticizing agents for their actions and attitudes. As Parfit puts it: 
When we call some act ‘rational’, using this word in its ordinary, non-technical sense, 
we express the kind of praise or approval that we can also express with words like 
‘sensible’, ‘reasonable’, ‘intelligent’, and ‘smart’. We use the word ‘irrational’ to express 
the kind of criticism we express with words like ‘senseless’, ‘stupid’, ‘idiotic’ and ‘crazy’. 
To express weaker criticisms of this kind, we can use the phrase ‘less than fully rational’ 
(2011, p. 33).  
Let φ stand for any rationally evaluable action or attitude. When an agent φs rationally, she thereby 
deserves a kind of credit for φing as she does. And when an agent φs irrationally, she thereby deserves 
a kind of criticism for φing as she does. According to Lord, this connection to credit and criticism is 
the “most fundamental feature” of rationality (p. 4).  
I agree that this connection to credit and criticism is at least a fundamental (if not the most 
fundamental) feature of rationality. So, it’s a precondition for the success of reasons-responsiveness 
 
77 Strictly speaking, it is not clear whether Kiesewetter and Lord are reductionists or error theorists about structural 
rationality. Lord, in particular, writes as if it is the merely apparent phenomenon of structural rationality that’s accounted 
for by his theory of substantive rationality. Kiesewetter’s remarks seem to be more neutral between reductionism and 
eliminativism. Since I am not focusing on structural rationality in this chapter, I will set this issue aside. I thank Alex 
Worsnip for making me aware of it.   
78 By contrast, Broome (2007, 2013) has argued that structural rationality is the only kind of rationality, and that the kinds 
of substantive requirements that reasons-responsiveness theorists talk about, while genuine requirements of reason, 
shouldn’t be thought of as requirements of rationality at all. I will set Broome’s arguments aside in this chapter.  




theories that they successfully explain this connection. And they can do so only if they rely on accounts 
of correctly responding to reasons that capture the sense in which, when we correctly respond to 
reasons, we are thereby creditworthy for our success in acting or holding attitudes in accordance with 
our reasons.  
Before moving on, it is important to attend to another distinction, between ex ante and ex 
post rationality. When φing is ex ante rational for an agent, it is rational for that agent to φ. But this 
doesn’t entail that the agent φs rationally. In fact, it doesn’t entail that she φs at all. When an agent’s 
φing is ex post rational, it is not just rational for her to φ, but she actually φs rationally. So, in short, the 
distinction between ex ante and ex post rationality is the distinction between its being rational for one 
to φ and one’s actually φing rationally.  Reasons-responsiveness theories are supposed to account for 
both ex ante and ex post rationality – that is, they tell us not just what it is for attitudes and actions to 
be rational to hold or perform, but what it is to act or hold attitudes rationally. They hold that to 
correctly respond to one’s reasons in φing is to φ rationally – to be ex post rational. For some φ to be 
ex ante rational is for it to be favored by some set of reasons such that, if the agent correctly responded 
to those reasons in φing, her φing would be ex post rational.  
2.2 Correctly responding to reasons 
Because my goal in this chapter is to provide an account of correctly responding to reasons, 
I’ll endeavor to provide as ecumenical as possible of a characterization at this point. Perhaps the easiest 
way to accomplish this is to discuss some cases that are obviously not cases of correctly responding to 
reasons.  But first, a note on the reasons themselves. Our subject matter is normative reasons – 
considerations that count in favor of or against φing. This is important because one goal of analyzing 
rationality is to account for its normativity. Since normative reasons are obviously normative, analyzing 
rationality in terms of normative reasons has the promise of straightforwardly accounting for the 




Within the realm of normative reasons, however, there’s considerable room for disagreement 
about which reasons are rationalizing reasons. Almost everyone agrees that only those reasons that 
are in the agent’s epistemic ken are rationalizing reasons. But reasons-responsiveness theorists disagree 
about whether these reasons are subjective reasons, or some subset of objective reasons.80 The 
distinction between subjective and objective reasons is itself fraught, and I will attempt to remain 
neutral about it. But almost everyone agrees that objective reasons don’t depend for their existence 
on being epistemically accessible by the agent, whereas subjective reasons do. Furthermore, objective 
reasons are uncontroversially construed as facts, whereas the notion of a subjective reason leaves it 
open that subjective reasons are merely apparent facts. Pointing out these two relatively 
uncontroversial features of the distinction is all I will do to characterize it for now.81 This is because 
my goal is to develop an account of correctly responding to reasons without antecedently taking a 
stance on which reasons rationalize. However, the account I develop will turn out to have implications 
for that debate. I’ll discuss those implications in §6.2.  
Whichever the rationalizing reasons are, one can φ in accordance with those reasons without 
correctly responding to them. Not only can one respond incorrectly to them, but one can fail to respond 
to them at all. Suppose the forecast is for rain tomorrow. This is a reason for me to believe that it will 
rain tomorrow, but I could come to believe that it will rain tomorrow in a way that has nothing to do 
with this reason. Imagine I consult a psychic, who tells me it will rain tomorrow, and it’s on that basis 
that I come to believe it will rain tomorrow. I now have the belief favored by the reason <the forecast 
is for rain tomorrow>, but I don’t respond to this reason in believing it.   
 
80 Subjective reasons are sometimes referred to as apparent reasons instead. For a defense of the subjective reasons 
approach, see Sylvan (2015). For a defense of the objective reasons approach, see Lord (2018). 
81 A further complication is that on some views, “possession” of a normative reason is a non-factive relation. See, for 




I might also respond to that reason, but incorrectly. Imagine I come to believe that it will rain 
tomorrow, on the basis of the reason <the forecast is for rain tomorrow>. However, this is because 
I also (irrationally) believe that the Illuminati controls both the forecast and the weather, so whenever 
the forecast is for rain it will rain. Despite the fact that I believe on the basis of a good reason, there 
seems to be something deficient about the way in which I do so.82  
Finally, I might correctly respond to some of my reasons without its being the case that I 
correctly respond to my reasons overall. Imagine there are two highly reliable weather channels: one 
says it will rain tomorrow and the other says it won’t. If I come to believe that it will rain on the basis 
of the first forecast and ignore the second, it seems natural to say I’ve correctly responded to one of 
my reasons, but I haven’t correctly responded to my reasons overall, because I haven’t responded at 
all to another reason I have. It’s clear that if rationality consists in correctly responding to reasons, it 
must consist in correctly responding to reasons that are sufficient to rationalize the relevant response.  
To correctly respond to one’s reasons in φing, one must not only φ when one’s reasons favor 
it; there needs to be some connection between one’s φing and the fact that one’s reasons favor it. 
Broome (2007) summarizes the point helpfully:  
Even if you F whenever your reasons require you to F, you might not be responding 
correctly to reasons; it might just be a coincidence. Some appropriate connection must 
hold between your reasons and your Fing. It may need to be an explanatory one. 
Alternatively, a mere counterfactual connection may be enough. For instance, the 
necessary condition might be that you would not have Fed had your reasons required 
you not to F. (p. 351) 
The possibility of incorrectly responding to a reason, rules out a simple but tempting account of 
correctly responding to reasons. On such an account, to correctly respond to some normative reason 
 
82 The possibility of this way of responding to a reason, but incorrectly, depends on the common assumption that reasons 
are atomic facts. Some, such as Fogal (2016) argue that this common assumption is false. For simplicity’s sake, I will 
assume the atomic view here. If the atomic view turns out to be false, many of the arguments in this debate will need to 




R to φ is just to φ on the basis of some motivating reason R and for R to also be a normative reason 
to φ. While this view is temptingly simple and straightforward, the Illuminati example above shows 
that it can’t be right.83,84 Unfortunately, the task of providing an account of correctly responding to 
reasons won’t be so easy. It will require a search for the “appropriate connection” mentioned by 
Broome – a connection that rules out cases of mere coincidence between one’s φing and the fact that 
one’s reasons rationalized φing.  
 
3. In Search of a Connection 
In this section, I’ll further discuss what the appropriate connection must look like, and 
consider a promising account, according to which the connection is a dispositional one.  
3.1. Sensitivity to reasons 
Consider again the case from above in which I respond to a reason, but incorrectly. I come to 
believe that it will rain tomorrow, on the basis of the reason <the forecast is for rain tomorrow>, 
because I (irrationally) believe that the Illuminati controls both the forecast and the weather, so 
whenever the forecast is for rain it will rain. Why is this a case of incorrectly responding to that reason? 
A plausible answer is that this is a case of incorrectly responding to a reason because I lack sensitivity 
to what we might call the contributory profile of that reason.85 The contributory profile of some reason 
R to φ specifies the normative support for φing provided by R across all contingencies. I lack sensitivity 
to the contributory profile of the reason <the forecast is for rain tomorrow> because my using it as 
 
83 Again, this is on the assumption that reasons are atomic facts.  
84 For further argument that a simple conjunctive view can’t be right, see Lord (2018, ch.6) and Lord and Sylvan 
(forthcoming).  




a reason to believe that it will rain tomorrow is contingent on my irrational belief that the Illuminati 
controls both the forecast and the weather. Since the normative support that consideration provides 
for my belief is not actually contingent on its being the case that the Illuminati controls both the 
forecast and the weather, there is a mismatch between the reason’s contributory profile and how I use 
it.  
So, in order to correctly respond to reasons, we must use those reasons in ways that line up 
with their contributory profiles. Of course, it can’t be a necessary condition that they line up 
completely, because many reasons will have contributory profiles that range over innumerable 
contingencies. To what degree they must line up is an interesting and difficult question, but I must set 
it aside here. For now, let’s just say that we must use those reasons in ways that line up with 
contextually determined subsets of their contributory profiles. My hope is that I can rely on an intuitive 
grasp of such contextual relevance, and so proceed without an account thereof.  
Why is it necessary for correctly responding to a reason that we be sensitive to its contributory 
profile? Because without such sensitivity, the connection between some consideration’s being a reason 
to φ and our φing is too tenuous to count as an appropriate connection. This doesn’t mean the 
appropriate connection is merely a counterfactual one. As Broome suggests, it is plausibly an 
explanatory connection. When there is an explanatory connection between some consideration’s being 
a reason to φ and our φing, it seems like in an important sense no accident that we φed when that 
consideration was a reason to φ. So, it’s plausible that that we correctly respond to some reason to φ 
only if we φ because it is a reason to φ. Moreover, it seems right to hold that when we fail to be 
sensitive to a reason’s contributory profile, it is precisely this explanatory connection that is missing.  
The idea that the appropriate connection is an explanatory one becomes even more compelling 
when we focus on the relationship between creditworthiness and reasons-responsiveness. If the 




it must be the case that when we correctly respond to reasons, we deserve credit for responding as we 
do. But it cannot simply be the truth of various counterfactuals that makes it the case that we’re 
creditworthy when we correctly respond to reasons, because such counterfactual facts do not secure 
a relevantly non-accidental connection between our reasons and our responses.86 By contrast, when 
we φ because of the fact that our reasons favor φing, this does seem to secure the appropriate connection 
such that we deserve credit for φing in accordance with our reasons.  
In light of this, I’ll proceed on the assumption that the connection we’re searching for is an 
explanatory connection between φing and R’s being a reason to φ that makes φing sensitive to R’s 
contributory profile. When such a connection obtains, it’s no mere accident that we φ when our 
reasons favor φing. And, crucially, our φing in accordance with our reasons is non-accidental in a 
particular way, such that we deserve credit for it.  
3.2. The promise of dispositions? 
What sort of connection could obtain between our φing and R’s being a reason to φ such that 
our φing is sensitive to R’s contributory profile? There are many possible answers, but one that has 
gained considerable popularity recently is that it is a dispositional connection. Such a dispositional 
connection would consist in manifesting dispositions to φ when R is a reason to φ and to cease φing 
when R ceases to be a reason to φ. Defenders of this dispositionalist view maintain that when we 
manifest such dispositions, we φ in virtue of the fact that R is a reason to φ. Moreover, they maintain 
that manifesting such dispositions is sufficient to make our φing sensitive in the right way to R’s 
contributory profile.  
 
86 For an argument that the relevant sense of non-accidentality (or non-coincidence) cannot be merely counterfactual, see 
Faraci (2019). While Faraci’s argument is about epistemic non-coincidence (the kind needed for knowledge), it applies 




This is precisely the kind of analysis of correctly responding to reasons defended by Errol 
Lord in his account of (ex post) rationality. Because of this, I will use Lord’s account as my primary 
foil in this chapter. On his account, for some agent A to correctly respond to some reason R is “for 
A’s φing to be a manifestation of A’s knowledge about how to use R as the reason it is to φ” (p. 139). 
Lord understands the relevant know-how in terms of the sort of dispositions mentioned above, which 
he calls essentially normative dispositions. These are dispositions that are essentially sensitive to 
normative facts – in this case, facts about normative reasons.87 
The dispositional account can explain why, in the case we began with, I incorrectly respond 
to the reason <the forecast is for rain tomorrow> in believing that it will rain tomorrow. My belief 
that it will rain tomorrow is a manifestation of certain dispositions I have to believe that proposition 
in certain situations. But these dispositions are insufficiently sensitive to the contributory profile of 
the reason for which I believe. So, although my belief is based on a consideration that constitutes a 
normative reason, it fails to be correctly responsive to that reason.  
Manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions secures a connection between our responses and 
the reasons for them that’s not merely counterfactual. In fact, Lord argues, it secures a familiar type 
of explanatory connection: a causal one. When φing manifests knowledge about how to use R as the 
reason it is to φ, the agent φs because R is a reason to φ, and this is a causal sense of ‘because.’ Of course, 
the problem of deviant causal chains shows us that not just any causal connection is the appropriate 
kind for our purposes. However, because this causal connection occurs through the manifestation of 
a reasons-sensitive disposition, Lord contends that it’s exactly the right sort of explanatory connection.  
 
87 Lord’s language of “essentially normative dispositions” follows Wedgwood’s (2006) language of “essentially rational 
dispositions). The dispositions in question are essentially normative in the sense that “it is part of the essence of these 
dispositions to be sensitive to normative features of facts” (Lord, 2019, p. 138). This notion may require further unpacking, 




Importantly, the dispositional account doesn’t require that the agent in any way takes the 
relevant consideration to be a reason for her to respond to it as a reason. As long as we manifest the 
right dispositions, we correctly respond to reasons, even if we have no mental states with normative 
content. In fact, on the dispositional account, we can correctly respond to reasons without in any way 
representing those reasons in our minds.  
This means that, on many accounts of what it is to φ for a motivating reason, including Lord’s 
own, correctly responding to a normative reason doesn’t require φing on the basis of any motivating 
reason at all. This is because on such accounts, φing on the basis of a motivating reason involves φing 
in virtue of taking that reason to count in favor of φing. If we accept such accounts (as both Lord and 
I do), then the dispositional account entails a kind of disjunctivism about responding to reasons.88  
According to this form of disjunctivism, responding to normative reasons and φing on the basis of 
motivating reasons are two distinct phenomena, and neither requires the other. This is a surprising 
conclusion, because despite the failure of the simple conjunctive account, we might have thought that 
φing on the basis of R, where R is a normative reason, was at least a necessary condition for correctly 
responding to R.  
As it turns out, the lack of any representation condition in the dispositional account plays an 
important role for Lord, because it allows him to solve the New Evil Demon problem while holding 
onto the claim that rationalizing reasons are objective normative reasons. So, in addition to being an 
independently promising account of correctly responding to reasons, the dispositional account has 
particular explanatory power for objective reasons theorists. I will return to this issue in §6.2.  
 
88 Because Lord accepts a representation condition on φing for motivating reasons, he embraces this kind of disjunctivism. 
For a defense of a representationalist account of motivating reasons that is neutral about responding to normative reasons, 




The dispositional account is clearly promising. And Lord argues persuasively that when 
plugged into the reasons-responsiveness framework for analyzing rationality, it delivers correct 
verdicts in a variety of cases. But an important question remains in the discussion of the dispositional 
account: when we φ by manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions, are we thereby creditworthy for 
φing? As discussed in §2.1, reasons-responsiveness theorists agree that rationality is intimately tied to 
creditworthiness. Since Lord emphasizes, and develops the dispositional account extensively, it’s 
surprising that he largely takes it for granted that manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions is 
sufficient to ground creditworthiness for our responses. It is precisely this assumption that I will 
question in the following section.  
 
4. Disposing of Dispositionalism 
In this section, I’ll examine what is supposed to be special about reasons-sensitive dispositions 
such that they ground creditworthiness. I’ll then argue that only dispositions with the right sort of 
basis in the agent can play this role. But if this is the case, the dispositions themselves cannot be what 
ground creditworthiness, so the dispositional account is inadequate.  
4.1. The appeal to competence 
Why think φing by manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions makes us creditworthy for φing 
in accordance with those reasons? Lord says surprisingly little about this. One thing he does say is that 
manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions is an achievement because such dispositions are competences. 
What does this mean? Here is Lord: 
What type of competence is this [disposition]? It is a competence to correctly respond 
to reasons. That is, it is a competence that is sensitive to some of the facts about 
reasons. When one exercises this competence, one’s actions are sensitive to the 
normative facts. One gets things right. Moreover, given the manifestation of a 
competence, it is no accident that one gets things right. This is why reacting for 
normative reasons is an achievement. And this is why one is creditworthy when one 




This is somewhat mysterious. Lord claims that manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions grounds 
creditworthiness because these dispositions are competences to correctly respond to reasons. But on 
the dispositional account, correctly responding to reasons consists in manifesting these dispositions. 
So, we are left with the claim that manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions grounds creditworthiness 
because these dispositions are competences to manifest these very dispositions. This leaves it entirely 
obscure what is special about competences such that manifesting them grounds creditworthiness.  
To put the point another way, labelling reasons-sensitive dispositions competences just pushes 
back the question of creditworthiness. Now, instead of asking why manifesting reasons-sensitive 
dispositions grounds creditworthiness, we need to ask why manifesting competences grounds 
creditworthiness. Labelling certain dispositions ‘competences’ doesn’t help the dispositional account 
shed any light on the relationship between creditworthiness and correctly responding to reasons.  
One thing that’s suggested by the passage above is that dispositions are competences when 
they dispose us to get things right. Indeed, Lord writes at various points as if this is what makes 
competences special. For example: “Importantly, this know how is a competence. It disposes one to get 
things right.” (p. 117). So, perhaps what’s special about competences is they reliably dispose us to 
success. This way of thinking about competence is in line with much of what Ernest Sosa, who 
popularized the language of competence in epistemology, says about what makes competences special. 
Sosa says that “a competence is a disposition, one with a basis resident in the competent agent, one 
that would in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any 
relevant performance issued by it” (2007, p. 29).89  
If this is what competences are (and why they’re special), then the dispositional account has 
somewhat of a story about why reasons-sensitive dispositions ground creditworthiness. Reasons-
 




sensitive dispositions to φ are competences because they reliably dispose the agent to achieve the 
relevant form of success, which in this case is φing in accordance with her reasons. This makes the 
appeal to competence somewhat less mysterious.  
4.2. Competence and creditworthiness 
If competences are dispositions to succeed, we’re left with the following question: does 
manifesting a disposition to succeed entail that the agent is creditworthy for her success? Proponents 
of the dispositional account think the answer is yes, but have done little to argue for this conclusion.  
I think the answer is no – that is, I think manifesting any old disposition to succeed is not 
sufficient for the agent to be creditworthy for that success. This is because the manifestation of a 
disposition doesn’t yield success that is attributable to the agent unless that disposition has a basis in 
the kind of categorical property of the agent that would make this disposition properly hers qua 
agent.90 Indeed, Sosa’s own characterization of competence says that a competence is a disposition 
“with a basis resident in the competent agent.” But for proponents of the dispositional account, this 
aspect of competence tends to drop out of the picture in favor of increased focus on reliability.  
If competences are a special class of dispositions that ground creditworthiness, they cannot 
be just any old dispositions to succeed. They must be dispositions to succeed with the appropriate 
basis in the agent. Without such a basis in the agent, such dispositions would not be the agent’s qua 
agent, and so success as a result of manifesting them could not be attributable to her. Manifesting such 
dispositions would not even be sufficient to make her actions, beliefs, and other responses intelligible, 
let alone rational.  
 
90 By ‘attributable’ I mean to pick out a property akin to responsibility in the attributability sense, as discussed by Shoemaker 




This point is related to (though ultimately distinct from) one made by Warren Quinn (1993) 
with his oft-discussed ‘radioman’ case:  
Suppose I am in a strange functional state that disposes me to turn on radios that I see 
to be turned off. Given the perception that a radio in my vicinity is off, I try, all other 
things being equal, to get it turned on. Does this state rationalize my choices? Told 
nothing more than this, one may certainly doubt that it does. But in the case I am 
imagining, this is all there is to the state (p. 236).  
Quinn goes on to argue that the manifestation of this disposition “may help explain, causally, why I 
turn on a particular radio, but it does not make the act sensible” (p. 237). He is arguing here against a 
simple dispositional account of desire. On such an account, he argues, desires could not even make 
our behavior intelligible, let alone rational. And, as various discussions of Quinn’s examples suggest, 
what is missing in this picture of desire is the agent’s actually seeing something good or worth having 
in the object of desire.91 Without such a component, there’s nothing that makes the output of a desire 
attributable to the agent.  
The dispositions Quinn discusses are, in an important sense, baseless dispositions. This isn’t 
to say they’re wholly metaphysically ungrounded; but since their basis is specified to be merely a 
functional state, they lack a basis in agent-level categorical properties. The dispositional account of 
correctly responding to reasons leaves room for the manifestation of similarly baseless dispositions, 
as long as those dispositions are sufficiently reliable. But it is a mistake to think that the addition of 
reliability makes any significant difference here. If it just so happened that one was reliably disposed 
to turn on radios only when doing so was independently desirable, this would not suffice to make the 
manifestation of that disposition any more intelligible of a behavior.  
Consider the forecast case again. Suppose I have a disposition to believe that it will rain 
tomorrow when <the forecast is for rain tomorrow> is a reason for me to believe that. But this isn’t 
 




because I in any way take what the forecast says to favor forming any particular beliefs. In fact, I have 
no views on the normative significance of the forecast. I simply have a disposition to form a certain 
belief when certain conditions obtain, with no basis in me qua agent. As such, I succeed in the sense 
that I believe in accordance with my reason; but I do not thereby deserve credit for my success.  
Once we specify that the dispositions being manifested are baseless, it is no longer compelling 
that the agent is creditworthy in virtue of manifesting such dispositions. In fact, it seems to me that 
the dispositional account gains undeserved appeal from the fact that, when this is specification is not 
made, we are inclined to fill in examples by attributing a categorical property to the agent as a basis 
for the relevant disposition. This is why cases of manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions seem to 
be cases where the agent is creditworthy for her success.  
Examples involving baseless dispositions recall another famous example: Laurence BonJour’s 
(1980) case of Norman the clairvoyant, which provides a powerful objection to reliabilism about 
epistemic justification. This affinity isn’t surprising, since the dispositional account ends up looking 
like a form of reliabilism about correctly responding to reasons. It wouldn’t be difficult to construct 
clairvoyant-style counterexamples to the dispositional account involving agents who manifest reliable 
dispositions to believe in accordance with normative reasons without actually basing their beliefs on 
those reasons.  
The basic point here is this: when an agent manifests a baseless disposition to φ, her take on 
the reasons to φ play no role in her φing. As such, there is nothing that makes her φing intelligible 
from her own perspective. In general, when we respond in ways that are unintelligible to us, there’s 
an important sense in which, if we respond successfully, this just happens to be the case. This is so even 
if in another sense it’s no mere accident that we succeed when we manifest dispositions to succeed. 




creditworthiness for success. And when we respond successfully even though our responses are 
unintelligible, it doesn’t seem like we are creditworthy for our success. 
This point can be further brought out by considering the influence of the agent’s own take on 
reasons on our intuitions about creditworthiness. Take the following pair of cases: 
May. May has promised a friend that she’ll drive him to the airport, and that fact 
constitutes sufficient reason for May to drive him to the airport. May is disposed to 
drive her friend to the airport when that fact is a reason to do so, and her disposition 
has a basis in her recognition of that reason as such. Manifesting this disposition, she 
drives him to the airport.  
Jay. Jay has also promised a friend that he’ll drive him to the airport, and that fact 
similarly constitutes sufficient reason for Jay to drive him to the airport. Jay is disposed 
to drive his friend to the airport when that fact is a reason to do so. But this disposition 
has no basis in Jay qua agent. Jay doesn’t recognize his reason as such, and instead 
takes the fact that his friend will owe him a favor to count in favor of his action. He 
also mistakenly thinks he’s disposed to drive his friend to the airport when this other 
fact is a reason. Nevertheless, he manifests the disposition he actually has, and drives 
his friend to the airport.  
May and Jay manifest the same disposition.92 But it seems only May, and not Jay, deserves credit for 
acting in accordance with a reason. Unlike the clairvoyant, Jay’s action is intelligible to him, because 
he has a story about why he did it. However, that story has nothing to do with the disposition that 
explains why he actually did it. This seems equally incompatible with his deserving credit for acting in 
accordance with a reason. And we can only explain why Jay lacks creditworthiness by appealing to 
something beyond the dispositions themselves.  
Ram Neta (2019) uses similar cases to criticize dispositional accounts of the basing relation. 
As he points out, divergence between the agent’s dispositions and her representations seems to 
prevent the manifestation of a disposition from being a justifying instance of the basing relation. This 
is something the dispositionalist can’t explain. The same is true of the dispositional account of 
 
92 I’m assuming that dispositions are not individuated by their bases. The point can easily be restated if this assumption 




correctly responding to reasons. It cannot explain why dispositions to succeed fail to ground 
creditworthiness for success when they lack a basis in the agent.  
5. The Return of Representation 
Proponents of dispositional accounts of correctly responding to reasons tend to be reliabilists 
about competence. As such, they reject the idea that the agent’s own representations need to play any 
role in correctly responding to reasons as overly intellectualized. My goal in this section is to first argue 
that this rejection is a mistake, and then, show how carving out a role for representations solves the 
problem of baseless dispositions.  
5.1. Do representations overintellectualize?  
In §4, I showed that reasons-sensitive dispositions can only ground creditworthiness if they 
have the right sort of basis in the agent. The most natural candidate for the appropriate basis is the 
agent’s own normative outlook – roughly, how she represents the world, normatively. This includes, 
of course, her take on which responses are favored by which considerations. It’s highly plausible that 
when manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions makes us creditworthy for our responses, it is because 
those dispositions issue from our normative outlooks. In other words – it’s plausible that having a 
basis in certain normative representations is what makes competences out of the relevant dispositions.   
Something like this is suggested in Neta’s account of the basing relation. While Neta doesn’t 
explicitly discuss creditworthiness, he contends that justifying instances of the basing relation consist 
in manifesting a reasons-sensitive disposition that’s partly constituted by the agent’s representation of 
that very disposition as justifying. He then argues that this correctly rules out cases of dispositions that 
are misrepresented, or not represented at all, from giving rise to justifying instances of the basing 




from, but closely related to, the question of what it is to correctly respond to a reason.93 While I won’t 
be able to fully explore that connection here, Neta’s view is worth noting because it shows that there 
are extant views on a related topic that recognize the role of representations in explaining the 
normative significance of certain dispositions. 
Despite all of this, many theorists (especially proponents of dispositionalism) have been hostile 
to the idea that normative representations play a role in correctly responding to reasons. This is usually 
because they see it as an overintellectualization. Lord contends throughout his book that it would 
overintellectualize rationality to include a representation condition at any point in the analysis of 
correctly responding to reasons. He offers a few different arguments for this claim.  
One argument is that a representation condition requires “one thought too many” (p. 103). 
For example, suppose I infer q from two known facts, p and pq. According to Lord, for this to be a 
case of correctly responding to p as a reason, all that needs to be the case is that I manifest my 
competence with modus ponens. It would be an overintellectualization to claim that I also need to 
believe that p is a reason to believe q.94 While I agree with Lord that the additional, explicit belief that 
p is a reason to believe q is unnecessary, it’s a mistake to assume that this is the only way representations 
can govern inferences. In fact, those who support a ‘taking condition’ on inference rarely spell that 
condition out in terms of additional, explicit beliefs about what particular token considerations are 
reasons for particular token responses.95  
 
93 The relationship between the two questions depends partly on the relationship between rationality and justification. See 
Sylvan (ms) for discussion.  
94 Furthermore, it would generate a kind of Carrollian regress. I discuss the worry that representationalism generates 
regresses in §5.2.  
95 The term ‘taking condition’ is has bene popularized by Paul Boghossian’s work on inference. See, for example, 




Instead, it’s much more plausible to think that more general representations are built into the 
relevant competence itself. It’s true that to correctly respond to a reason by making a modus ponens 
inference, I need only manifest my competence with modus ponens. The issue is what counts as a 
competence with modus ponens. And as Paul Boghossian has argued in a number of places, a 
disposition to make transitions in accordance with modus ponens is not enough. As I’ve argued, such 
dispositions must have a basis in the agent. This basis could be a general representation of the modus 
ponens schema, rather than a representation of normative support between a particular reason and a 
particular belief. So, the involvement of representations does not introduce, as Lord claims it does, a 
proliferation of representations specific to token instances of inferences. 
This point applies to the competences involved in reasons-responsiveness more generally. To 
claim that competences are governed by representations is not to claim that each instance of 
responding to reasons is governed by its own discrete representation. Just as multiple instances of 
responding to reasons might manifest the same disposition (whose manifestation-conditions might 
correspond to a more general principle), these competence-constituting dispositions can also be 
governed by representations of more general schemata (which themselves might correspond to the 
same general principles). And these representations don’t need to take the form of explicit beliefs to 
play this role.  
The same sort of point can be made in response to Lord’s second argument, which is that 
when we look at other competences, such as linguistic competence, it’s not plausible that they require 
representations. For example, it’s not plausible that manifesting competence with the word ‘red’ 
requires having “beliefs about the semantic relations between objects with a certain hue and the word 
‘red’” (p. 119). Again, I agree with Lord that such beliefs are unnecessary. But again, it’s a mistake to 
think this is the only way in which representations could be necessary for competence. In fact, many 




representational component to it. For example, Chomsky (1980) argues that linguistic competence is 
not characterizable solely in terms of dispositions, capacities, or abilities precisely because it 
constitutively involves representations. These representations consist not in explicit beliefs about 
particular objects and words, but rather mental structures that encode more general linguistic patterns.  
Of course, representationalist theories of linguistic competence are controversial. But the fact 
that they are considered plausible by many linguists and philosophers of language makes linguistic 
competence an unsuitable example if the goal is to show that competences in general don’t require 
representation. If competences are dispositions governed by representations, they are governed by 
representations of patterns, rules, or schemata, not by the kinds of beliefs discussed by Lord.  
Finally, Lord argues that representation conditions are simply too demanding. Here, he quotes 
Parfit: 
We can have rational beliefs and desires, and act rationally, without having any beliefs 
about reasons. Young children respond rationally to certain reasons or apparent 
reasons, though they do not yet have the concept of a reason. Dogs, cats, and some 
other animals respond to some kinds of reason…though they will never have the 
concept of a reason. And some rational adults seem to lack this concept (2011, p. 118).  
Lord uses this quotation to bring out the implausibility of a view he calls the Reasons Belief view, 
according to which correctly responding to a reason requires believing the relevant consideration to 
be a reason to φ (p. 102). According to Lord, this view is implausible because, since beliefs represent 
their contents, it entails that creatures that lack the concept of a reason can possess reasons.  
There are two responses to this argument. The first is that talk of ‘beliefs about reasons’ evokes 
explicit beliefs about what particular token considerations are reasons for particular token responses. 
And it’s indeed implausible that such beliefs are necessary for correctly responding to reasons. But as 
I’ve already pointed out in this section, this isn’t what the representationalist should think anyway. 
Instead, the representationalist should think that more general representations come into the picture 




representations are those of her categorical properties in virtue of which she is disposed to φ when 
she has sufficient reason to φ.  
The second response is that both Parfit and Lord, as well as others who complain about 
overintellectualization, drastically overstate the case for including young children and non-human 
animals as creatures that respond to reasons in the same sense that we do. Notice that when Parfit 
and Lord complain about overintellectualization, talk of creditworthiness drops out. But for both of 
them, the connection to credit and criticism is supposed to be fundamental to rationality. Indeed, it 
was their own remarks I appealed to in connecting rationality to creditworthiness in §2.1. This 
generates an internal tension for Parfit and Lord. 
We generally don’t treat young children and non-human animals as the sort of rational agents 
who are the appropriate objects of credit and criticism. We don’t hold them responsible in the way we 
hold full rational agents responsible, and we don’t consider their success or failure to be attributable 
to their agency. So, if rationality, and thereby responsiveness to reasons, are so deeply connected to 
credit and criticism, why should we think young children and non-human animals are capable of 
responding to reasons in the way full rational agents are? Parfit and Lord’s own commitments 
undermine their complaints.  
Of course, there is some sense in which it’s right to say that young children and non-human 
animals respond to reasons. But whatever this sense is, it’s much more minimal than whatever is 
required for rationality, conceived of as an achievement of agents who are fully appropriate objects of 
credit and criticism. This points to a way in which the dispositional account might actually 
underintellectualize rationality. Dispositionalism allows for beings that are not appropriate objects of 
credit or criticism to count as correctly responding to reasons. This violates a shared commitment 
among reasons-responsiveness theorists: that rationality and creditworthiness are deeply and 




5.2. Reasons-responsiveness requires representation 
Proponents of the dispositional account of correctly responding to reasons eschew 
representation because they think it overintellectualizes rationality. I’ve shown that this is a mistake. 
In doing so, I’ve also outlined the shape of an account that carves out an important role for 
representations. At a certain level of description, such an account looks like the dispositional account. 
That’s because I’m happy to agree with Lord that to correctly respond to reasons is to manifest a 
competence. I’m also happy to agree that this competence involves reasons-sensitive dispositions.  
But I disagree with the dispositional account’s commitment that the reliability of such 
dispositions is sufficient to make them competences. No matter how reliably they dispose us toward 
success, dispositions are not normatively significant unless they are our dispositions. Without an agent-
level basis, the manifestation of a disposition cannot be an expression of our agency, and thus cannot 
be to our credit. The missing piece, I have claimed, is the agent’s own normative outlook. What does 
this look like? I’ve gestured at some examples already. Being competent with modus ponens, I’ve 
suggested, requires not just that the agent be disposed to make transitions in accordance with modus 
ponens, but also that this disposition be governed by a representation of the modus ponens schema 
or inference pattern. Again, this should not be confused with a requirement that the agent think 
thoughts like “p is a reason to believe q” or “q follows from p” while drawing the conclusion.   
We can generalize from this example. Recall that according to the dispositional account, an 
agent correctly responds to a reason when she manifests a disposition that’s sufficiently sensitive to 
its contributory profile. When q follows from p, p is a reason to believe q that has a particular 
contributory profile. To be disposed to make transitions in accordance with modus ponens just is to 
have a disposition to believe q that’s sensitive to this reason’s contributory profile. What my account 




basis in the agent’s representation of that contributory profile. In the modus ponens example, a 
representation of the modus ponens schema plays this role.  
Here is a brief statement of the view this gets us:  
Representationalism: A correctly responds to some reason R in φing if and only if 
A manifests a disposition to φ that is sufficiently sensitive to R’s contributory profile 
in virtue of having as its categorical basis A’s representation of R’s contributory profile.  
A representation of a reason’s contributory profile is a representation of a consideration’s normative 
support for a response under various contingencies. So, the representations involved in correctly 
responding to reasons are normative representations – that is, they are representations with normative 
content. So, I embrace the view that correctly responding to reasons requires possessing the concept 
of a reason.96 In fact, it’s precisely this commitment that allows my account to explain the relationship 
between creditworthiness and correctly responding to reasons – something the dispositional account 
has failed to do.  
Consider May and Jay again. May and Jay manifest the same disposition, but it seems only 
May, not Jay, deserves credit for acting in accordance with a reason. My account makes good sense of 
this. While both May and Jay manifest the requisite reasons-sensitive disposition, Jay’s disposition 
lacks the appropriate categorical basis because he fails to have a sufficiently accurate representation of 
the reason’s contributory profile. By contrast, May’s disposition has a basis in precisely such a 
representation, and thus a basis in her qua agent. In other words, while May manifests a competence, 
Jay manifests a mere disposition. And mere dispositions lack normative significance.  
 
96 In Chapter 2, I argued that φing on the basis of motivating reasons requires possessing the concept of a normative 
reason, whether or not the motivating reasons on the basis of which one φs are normative reasons. If this is right, then 
correctly responding to normative reasons requires the same concepts as the more general case of φing on the basis of 




Why does the addition of a normative representation make May creditworthy where Jay is not? 
The answer is that the kind of representation I have in mind is a committal representation: in 
representing some consideration as a reason, May commits herself to its being a reason. And it is 
precisely in virtue of this commitment that May has and manifests a disposition that’s sensitive to that 
reason. Unlike Jay, May implicates her agency in her dispositions. This is why, when she manifests 
that disposition, her success in acting in accordance with a reason is attributable to her. So, this is why 
she deserves credit for her success while Jay does not.97 
At this point, proponents of the dispositional account might level another objection against 
representationalism. So far, I’ve only claimed that the representations involved in correctly responding 
to reasons must be sufficiently accurate. But it might be objected that this is insufficient, because in 
order for these representations to confer a positive normative status like creditworthiness on agents, 
they must themselves enjoy some positive normative status. In fact, one might think, in order for 
representations to confer creditworthiness on us for our responses, we must be creditworthy for the 
accuracy of those representations. This raises the threat of a regress of creditworthiness similar to the 
regresses of justification that have long been discussed in epistemology.  
I’m sympathetic to the thought that the representations involved in correctly responding to 
reasons must themselves have some positive normative status, so I take the threat of regress seriously. 
Fortunately, however, it’s plausible that the correct solution to the regress problem in epistemology 
will be generalizable to a solution to the threat of regress here.98 To show this, it will be useful to 
 
97 This is, of course, only a brief characterization of what it is for a representation to be committal. Unfortunately, it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an account of commitments. For a more detailed characterization of 
commitments that is congenial to what I say in this chapter, see Neta (2018).  




briefly consider what foundationalist and coherentist solutions might look like when applied my 
account.99  
A foundationalist solution would distinguish between basic and non-basic normative 
representations. If an instance of correctly responding to reasons involves a non-basic normative 
representation, this representation must be not just accurate, but itself correctly responsive to reasons. 
By contrast, if an instance of correctly responding to reasons involves a basic representation (such as 
a perceptual representation), this representation need not itself be correctly responsive to reasons. 
Instead, it must simply be a representation to which the agent is entitled, where entitlement is a distinct 
property from rationality that does not require responsiveness to reasons.100 Since perceptual 
representations, among others, are paradigmatic candidates for representations to which we are 
entitled, this would provide a plausible foundationalist picture of how normative representations can 
play the role they need to in correct responsiveness to reasons.101  
A coherentist solution would instead require that the agent’s normative representations fit 
together in the right way. Considering the myriad relations various reasons have been theorized to 
stand in (enabling and disabling, intensifying, etc.), it’s easy to see how representations of various 
reasons’ contributory profiles could either form a coherent overall normative outlook, or come into 
conflict by representing the world in incompatible ways. On the coherentist solution, these 
 
99 For a canonical discussion of foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology, see Sosa (1980).  
100 The fact that basic representations aren’t themselves responsive to reasons doesn’t imply that they are somehow blind 
or unintelligent. A representation that isn’t responsive to reasons can still be dynamic in the sense that it updates in the 
face of certain kind of feedback. The idea of states that are intelligent and can confer positive normative status upon 
further responses without themselves being responsive to reasons is discussed at great length in the recent work of Peter 
Railton, especially in his 2018 Locke Lectures. See also Railton (2012, 2017a, 2017b).   
101 The notion of entitlement figures prominently in recent foundationalist thought. See, for example, Burge (1993), 




representations have the relevant positive status in virtue of fitting into a coherent web of 
representations that constitute the agent’s overall normative outlook.  
While I’m more partial to foundationalism than coherentism, I don’t need to decide between 
them here. My point is not that there is an obviously correct solution to the regress problem. Rather, 
my point is that it’s a new version of an old problem, and there is plenty of reason for optimism that 
whatever the solution to the old problem is, it can be generalized to provide a solution to the new one. 
So, while I grant that the representations involved in correctly responding to reasons must themselves 
have some positive normative status, I don’t think that compels me to solve the regress problem here.   
Here’s what I’ve done so far: I’ve shown that the dispositional account is inadequate because 
it cannot explain the element of creditworthiness in correctly responding to reasons. In doing so, I 
have motivated the need for a further condition on correctly responding to reasons. Finally, I’ve 
sketched that further condition in the form of representationalism about correctly responding to 
reasons.  
Representationalism rejects the claim that manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions is 
sufficient for correctly responding to reasons. But while representationalism is in this way 
incompatible with the dispositional account, it still leaves room for an important role for dispositions 
as expressions of the commitments that come out of our normative representations. In slogan form: 
to correctly respond to reasons is to manifest reasons-sensitive dispositions in virtue of representing 
those reasons as the reasons they are. Both dispositions and representations play an important role, 
but it is fundamentally the agent’s representations that confer normative significance on the 
disposition-manifestations that constitute instances of correctly responding to reasons. So, it is 







I’ll now discuss two implications of representationalism for the theory of rationality. First, 
representationalism undermines the motivation for disjunctivism about responding to reasons. 
Second, representationalism shows that objective reasons versions of reasons-responsiveness theories 
of rationality cannot solve the New Evil Demon problem.  
6.1. Disjunctivism 
According to the dispositional account, correctly responding to normative reasons is a matter 
of manifesting dispositions that are sensitive to those reasons. According to the view of motivating 
reasons that both Lord and I accept, φing on the basis of motivating reasons is a matter of responding 
in virtue of taking them to be normative reasons, whether or not they are. As mentioned in §3.2, this 
commits Lord to a kind of disjunctivism about responding to reasons, according to which φing for a 
motivating reason is not a necessary condition for correctly responding to a normative reason. 
This is a surprising conclusion. As Lord points out, it’s widely held that responding to a 
normative reason is a special case of φing for a motivating reason. But Lord thinks this is false, because 
while φing for a motivating reason requires representing it as a normative reason, responding to a 
normative reason doesn’t require any representation at all. So, for Lord, responding to normative 
reasons is not a special case of responding to motivating reasons, but instead a distinct phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, he claims, both of these phenomena are members of a higher-order disjunctive kind. 
Lord’s disjunctivism comes at a theoretical cost, though, because unity is a theoretical virtue, and 
disjunctive kinds are not truly unifying. However, Lord thinks that since we have independent reason 
to accept a representation condition on φing for motivating reasons, but reject it when it comes to 
responding to normative reasons, we have independent reason to accept disjunctivism.  
If we accept representationalism about responding to normative reasons, on the other hand, 




for the view that responding to normative reasons is a special case of φing for motivating reasons. 
Assume that Lord and I are right about motivating reasons; to φ on the basis of a motivating reason 
is to φ in virtue of representing it as a normative reason. According to representationalism, to correctly 
respond to a normative reason in φing is to φ in virtue of representing that reason’s contributory 
profile (where this representation is sufficiently accurate and itself has the requisite positive normative 
status). Representationalism entails that when one responds to some reason R as a normative reason, 
one also φs on the basis of R as a motivating reason. This is because in both cases, one represents R 
as a normative reason. R’s being one’s motivating reason is strictly weaker in two ways: first, it doesn’t 
require that one actually φs in accordance with a normative reason, and second, it doesn’t require one’s 
representation of R as a normative reason to be accurate, or to have any positive normative status.   
It’s worth reiterating here that representationalism is not what Lord calls the “composite 
account,” according to which responding to a normative reason is just φing on the basis of a motivating 
reason that happens to be a normative reason. Such simple conjunctive accounts were rejected at the 
outset of this chapter. According to Lord, the failure of the composite account motivates 
disjunctivism. This is false, because disjunctivism and the composite account are not the only options. 
As I’ve just shown, representationalism entails that responding to a normative reason is a special case 
of φing on the basis of a motivating reason, but does not entail the composite account.  
There’s one more thing to say here. Lord also motivates disjunctivism using another putative 
contrast between φing for motivating reasons and responding to normative reasons, which is that the 
former makes one’s responses intelligible, whereas the latter makes them achievements. As Lord points 
out, mere intelligibility is not an achievement. I agree with all of this, but I think it tells against 
disjunctivism rather than in favor of it. Lord is obviously right to point out that intelligibility is not 
sufficient for achievement. But it’s quite plausible that intelligibility is necessary for achievement. As I 




intelligible. So, if φing for motivating reasons is what makes one’s φing intelligible, as Lord and I both 
think, we should think φing for motivating reasons is a precondition for responding to normative 
reasons. In other words, we should think that responding to normative reasons is a special case of 
φing on the basis of motivating reasons. Once we notice that intelligibility is a precondition for 
creditworthiness, this further undermines disjunctivism instead of supporting it.  
6.2. Objective reasons theories 
As I mentioned in §2.2, reasons-responsiveness theorists disagree about whether rationalizing 
reasons are subjective reasons, or some subset of objective reasons. I have tried to develop an account 
of correctly responding to reasons without antecedently taking a stance on which reasons rationalize. 
None of the arguments I offered in favor of representationalism turned on whether rationalizing 
reasons are objective or subjective reasons. Nevertheless, representationalism turns out to have 
substantial implications for that debate. This is because the debate is closely related to the debate 
between externalism and internalism about rationality. And externalist theories of rationality face the 
New Evil Demon problem. As it turns out, Lord’s solution to the New Evil Demon problem depends 
on dispositionalism about correctly responding to reasons. I’ve argued on independent grounds that 
we should reject dispositionalism in favor of representationalism. As I’ll show, this undermines Lord’s 
solution to the New Evil Demon problem, and thereby undermines objective reasons theories.  
Here is a brief explanation of the New Evil Demon problem, how it applies to objective 
reasons theories, and Lord’s solution.102 The problem is as follows: imagine that in two possible 
worlds, w1 and w2, you have the same experiences and apparent memories, and you reason in the same 
way to arrive at the same beliefs, actions, and other reactions. It seems obvious that in each world, 
 
102 The New Evil Demon problem was originally raised by Lehrer and Cohen (1983) as a problem for reliabilism about 
epistemic justification. It has since become a sticking point in the related debate between internalists and externalists about 




your reactions are equally rational. Now, imagine that while in w1 you’re getting things mostly right, in 
w2 you are being systematically deceived by an evil demon. As Wedgwood (2002) notes, intuitively, 
it’s still the case that you’re equally rational in both worlds. Internal duplicates – agents with identical 
non-factive mental states – seem to be equally rational. This suggests that rationality (at least) 
supervenes on agents’ non-factive mental states. But externalists about rationality hold that rationality 
depends on something other than agents’ non-factive mental states.  
Here’s how the New Evil Demon problem applies to objective reasons theories of rationality 
like Lord’s. According to such theories, rationality depends on (some subset of) objective normative 
reasons, which are facts. But the relevant facts exist only in the good cases. The worry is that if the 
rationalizing reasons present in the good cases are missing in the bad ones, then objective reasons 
theories yield the incorrect verdict that bad case agents are irrational despite being internal duplicates.  
For example, consider the following pair of cases. In the good case, it’s cold outside and this 
fact is an objective reason for you to wear a jacket. Correctly responding to this reason, you wear a 
jacket when you go outside. It seems you are rational. In the bad case, it appears to be cold outside, 
but you’re being deceived by an evil demon. Reasoning in exactly the same way, you wear a jacket 
when you go outside. It seems you’re no less rational in the bad case than in the good case. However, 
in the bad case, you can’t be correctly responding to the objective reason that it’s cold outside, since 
that’s not a fact. The burden is on objective reasons theorists to explain why you’re still rational in the 
bad case.   
This ‘backup reasons’ strategy says that for every objective reason of the form <p> in good 
cases, there are backup reasons roughly of the form <it appears that p> in bad cases. Furthermore, 
whenever the non-backup reasons are sufficient rationalizers, so are the backup reasons. This 
guarantees that if there are sufficient rationalizers in the good case, there are sufficient rationalizers in 




response rational). Although I’m suspicious of this claim, I’ll grant it to Lord for the sake of 
argument.103  
Lord’s work isn’t done, however. To solve the New Evil Demon problem for ex post rationality, 
it’s not enough to show that if there are sufficient rationalizers in the good case, there are sufficient 
rationalizers in the bad case. It must also be shown that in the bad case, the agent actually responds 
rationally – that she correctly responds to her reasons. So, if the backup reasons strategy is going to 
work, it must be that in the bad case, the agent correctly responds to the backup reasons.  
This is where dispositionalism comes in. On the dispositional account, correctly responding 
to reasons is a matter of manifesting reasons-sensitive dispositions. And as Lord argues, it’s plausible 
that when one manifests a disposition to φ that’s sensitive to a reason of the form <p>, one also 
manifests a disposition that’s sensitive to a reason of the form <it appears that p>. For example, in 
the good case, you manifest a disposition to wear a jacket when the fact that it’s cold outside is an 
objective reason to do so. You also thereby manifest a disposition to wear a jacket when the fact that 
it appears to be cold outside is an objective reason to do so. In the bad case, you only manifest the 
latter disposition. So, the dispositional account yields the verdict that in the bad case, the agent 
correctly responds to the backup reasons. But the dispositional account is false. Manifesting reasons-
sensitive dispositions is insufficient for correctly responding to reasons. Correctly responding to 
reasons also requires that those dispositions have a categorical basis in the agent’s representations of 
reasons.  
This spells trouble for objective reasons theories, because it looks like the agent’s responses 
are explained by the very same representations in both the good cases and the bad ones: 
representations of the non-backup reasons. Ordinarily, as Lord himself admits, it’s what appears to us 
 




as facts that we represent as reasons, not the fact that they appear to us.104 This is evidenced by the 
fact that when we cite our reasons, we ordinarily cite putative worldly facts, not appearance facts. So, 
once representationalism is on the table, it’s not plausible that we respond to the backup reasons 
whenever we respond to the non-backup reasons.  
Lord’s response to the New Evil Demon problem is ingenious, and probably the best response 
an objective reasons theorist can give. But since representationalism, not dispositionalism, is correct, 
Lord’s response fails. This suggests that, insofar as the New Evil Demon problem is compelling, it’s 
a fatal problem for objective reasons versions of reasons-responsiveness theories of rationality.  
As such, the debate about what it is to correctly respond to a reason turns out to have 
substantial implications for the debate over which reasons are rationalizing reasons. Objective reasons 
theories face the New Evil Demon problem, and the best solution available to them depends on an 
account of correctly responding to reasons I’ve argued is inadequate. Since reasons-responsiveness 
theorists should accept representationalism about correctly responding to reasons, they should also 
think that rationality does not consist in correctly responding to objective normative reasons. Instead, 
rationality consists in correctly responding to some non-factive kind of normative reason, whether we 
call them subjective reasons or something else.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 When one φs rationally, as opposed to just φing when it is rational to φ, this is so in virtue of 
the fact that one has not merely complied with the standard of rationality, but been guided by it in 
φing. Thus, this chapter shows that rationality fits the structure of normative achievement. In doing 
 
104 Objective reasons theorists might respond that we represent both reasons in the good case. But this would mean that 
what is shared between the good case and the bad case is the representation of the backup reason, rendering the non-




so, it sheds light on the nature of normative achievement, because it sheds light on what it is to 
correctly respond to reasons. In my discussion of moral worth, I showed that correctly responding to 
moral reasons requires responding to moral reasons as such. In this discussion of rationality, I have 
shown that rationality similarly requires representing one’s reasons as the reasons they are. And I have 
defended the inclusion of such a representation condition against the dispositionalist alternative. All 
of this, I think, makes a strong case for the inclusion of a general representation condition on 
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With my accounts of motivating reasons, moral worth, and rationality in mind, I am now in a 
position to return to a general discussion of normative achievement. As a reminder, a normative 
achievement is the positive status an action, thought, or feeling has when it is guided by a standard 
that governs it, as opposed to merely complying with that standard. On my account, normative 
achievements consist in being guided by a standard through responsiveness to normative reasons that 
are connected in the right way to that standard. Although the category of normative achievements has 
much broader application, I have focused on two particular achievements in this dissertation: moral 
worth and rationality. In focusing on them, I have tried to draw out some general features of normative 
achievement. I have also tried to illuminate the structure of normative achievement by discussing the 
nature of motivating reasons – the reasons on the basis of which we act, think, and feel.  
I began this dissertation by introducing the category of normative achievements, outlining its 
structure, and giving a brief, schematic argument about the implications of this category for the 
centrality of reasons in normative theory. I have a few different goals in this concluding chapter. In 
§2, I will tie together threads from my discussions of moral worth and rationality to further fill out my 
account of the general structure of normative achievement. In §3, I will attempt to show how my 
account can be extended to other achievements, using knowledge as an example. Finally, in §4, I will 
return to the topic of the centrality of reasons in normative theory and argue that, in light of the 
explanatory power I have shown the category of normative achievements to have, the case for the 





2. Moral Worth, Rationality, and the Structure of Normative Achievement 
 In Chapter 1, I used the following figure to illustrate the general structure of normative 
achievement: 
 
As I argued, the two explanatory relations in this diagram reflect two explanatory roles played by 
normative reasons. The first is an explanatory relation between normative reasons and the normative 
standard they bear on. In its simplest manifestation, this explanatory relation is a determination relation: 
the balance of normative reasons of the relevant kind determine the overall normative status of an 
action, thought, or feeling (in other words, where it complies with the relevant standard). The second 
is an explanatory relation between normative reasons and the agent’s φing, where this instance of φing 
is an instance of complying with the relevant standard. The structure of normative achievement is one 
where the very same thing (a set of normative reasons) explains both the agent’s φing and the standard 




 The accounts of moral worth and rationality I have defended fit this structure. On my account 
of moral worth, a morally worthy action is one where the agent acts on the basis of (a sufficient subset 
of) the moral reasons that make the action right. The following figure illustrates how this fits the 
structure of normative achievement: 
 
The first explanatory role is played by a determination relation: whether an action is right or wrong is 
determined by the balance of moral reasons. The second explanatory role is played by correct 
responsiveness to those moral reasons. When moral reasons play both of these explanatory roles, they 
make it the case that the agent is guided by moral rightness in her action. This is a normative 
achievement.  
Similar accounts of moral worth that already exist in the literature recognize that moral worth 
has this structure, where the very same moral reasons at once explain the rightness of the action and 
the agent’s performing that action. However, they do not generally recognize this structure as an 
instance of a broader category. Moreover, a crucial part of my disagreement with such accounts has 




agent’s performing that action. They fail to do this because they fail to exclude cases in which the 
agent acts on the basis of moral reasons, but does not correctly respond to them as moral reasons. In 
such cases, the relevant explanatory relation between the agent’s action and the reasons for which she 
acts fails to obtain. By contrast, I have argued that morally worthy action requires acting on the basis 
of (sufficient) moral reasons as such. To act on the basis of moral reasons as such is to act on the basis 
of those reasons in virtue of representing those reasons as the kind of normative reasons they are: 
reasons that determine the overall moral status of an action (as opposed to some other normative 
status).  






Just as the balance of moral reasons determines the rightness of an action, the balance of rationalizing 
reasons determines the ex ante rationality of an action or attitude.105 And just as moral worth consists 
in correctly responding to (sufficient) moral reasons, ex post rationality consists in correctly 
responding to (sufficient) rationalizing reasons. Furthermore, to correctly respond to rationalizing 
reasons, the agent must φ in virtue of representing the contributory profile of those reasons (roughly, 
their normative force under various contingencies). So, the parallels between moral worth and ex post 
rationality run deep.  
 These parallels are summarized in the following table: 
 Table 1: Moral Worth and Ex Post Rationality 
Moral Worth Ex Post Rationality 
An achievement over and above right 
action 
An achievement over and above ex 
ante rationality 
Consists in correctly responding to moral 
reasons 
Consists in correctly responding to 
rationalizing reasons 
Requires representing moral reasons as the 
reasons they are 
Requires representing rationalizing 
reasons as the reasons they are 
 
For both moral worth and rationality, it is independently plausible that there is a representation 
condition on the relevant form of reasons-responsiveness. Because both moral worth and rationality 
fit the structure of normative achievement, this suggests that there is a representation condition on 
normative achievement in general. To correctly respond to reasons in the manner required for 
 
105 I have not provided an account of rationalizing reasons; rather, I have simply introduced this term to refer to whichever 
reasons rationalize actions and attitudes. I did, however, offer an argument in Chapter 4 that rationalizing reasons cannot 
be objective normative reasons. That argument was that, given the failure of dispositionalism about correctly responding 




normative achievement, we must respond to our reasons as the reasons they are.106 This is not to 
merely be disposed to φ in the right circumstances, but rather to φ in light of representing our reasons 
as the reasons they are.  
The case for including a representation condition on normative achievement in general is 
further bolstered by the fact that, as I have argued, φing for any (motivating) reason at all requires a 
more general representation of one’s reasons as normative reasons. Normative achievements like 
moral worth and rationality require, on top of that, representing one’s reasons as the normative reasons 
they are. Without such a condition, we would not be able to explain the sense in which the agent’s 
success is attributable to her as a rational agent in every case of normative achievement.  
 
3. Knowledge as a Normative Achievement 
 The normative achievements I have focused on in this dissertation are moral worth and (ex 
post) rationality. But there are far more normative achievements than just those two. For any 
normative standard that bears the right explanatory relations to certain kinds of normative reasons, 
there should be a corresponding normative achievement that consists in correctly responding to 
reasons of that kind. One such normative achievement, I would like to briefly suggest, is knowledge. 
There is a long tradition in epistemology of viewing knowledge as an achievement over and above 
true belief.107 Moreover, the additional ingredient that makes a true belief an instance of knowledge is 
 
106 Representing a reason as the reason it is doesn’t necessarily amount to the same thing in all cases of normative 
achievement. For example, representing moral reasons as the reasons they are requires representing them as contributing 
to the overall moral status of the action. Rationalizing reasons, however, aren’t kinds of reasons in exactly the same way 
moral reasons are, since rationalizing reasons can have all sorts of sources. This is why representing a rationalizing reason 
as the reason it is instead requires representing its contributory profile (its normative support across various contingencies). 
Thanks to Alex Worsnip for suggesting that I clarify this.  
107 Of course, almost everyone agrees that knowledge is more than just true belief. The view that it is an achievement on the 




often thought to be one that in some way connects the agent’s believing that p to the truth of p. One 
might think this consists in the agent’s belief that p being guided by the truth of p. In other words, one 
might think knowledge is a normative achievement.108  
 The basic idea behind thinking of knowledge as a normative achievement is that knowledge is 
belief held for reasons that bear the right explanatory connection to the truth. Now, it might 
immediately be objected that truth is not a normative standard. However, correctness is a normative 
standard, and the standard view in epistemology is that the correctness condition for belief is truth.109 
So, strictly speaking, the normative standard involved in knowledge is doxastic correctness. But for 
simplicity’s sake, I will put things in terms of truth itself. With this in mind, the first steps in fleshing 
out the structure of knowledge as a normative achievement are clear. As a normative achievement, 
knowledge must have a structure in which a certain class of normative reasons play two explanatory 
roles. The first is to bear an explanatory relation to the truth of the proposition believed, and the 
second is to bear an explanatory relation to the token belief itself.  
 Three questions remain. First, what is the relevant class of normative reasons? Second, what 
explanatory relation must they bear to the truth? And third, what explanatory relation must they bear 
to the token belief? I will not undertake to answer these questions fully in this chapter, for unlike with 
moral worth and rationality, my goal here is only to illustrate the potential for analyzing knowledge as 
a normative achievement. Nevertheless, I will gesture at some answers. The third question, I think, is 
 
See, for example, Sosa (2007, 2010, 2015), Greco (2003, 2007, 2010), Riggs (2009), and Zagzebski (2003). For dissent, see 
Lackey (2007, 2009).  
108 This, of course, would mean that knowledge is normative, which is a controversial proposition. For a recent argument 
that knowledge is non-normative, see Sylvan (2018). A full account of knowledge as a normative achievement would need 
to address arguments that knowledge is non-normative.  




the easiest to answer, at least in general terms. As with moral worth and rationality, it’s plausible that 
the explanatory relation between normative reasons and token beliefs that count as knowledge must 
also be correct responsiveness to those reasons.110 If I am right about there being a representation 
condition on correct responsiveness to reasons, then there must be some kind of representation 
involved in this case. I will remain neutral as to how that representation condition manifests in the 
case of knowledge.  
 The answers to the other questions will have to be a bit more complicated. In the case of 
moral worth and rationality, they were relatively simple. The relevant explanatory relation was a 
relation of determination, and the relevant class of normative reasons was those reasons that 
determined the relevant overall status. In the case of moral worth, it was moral reasons, because the 
balance of moral reasons determines the rightness of an action. In the case of ex post rationality, it 
was rationalizing reasons, because the balance of rationalizing reasons determines the ex ante 
rationality of an action or attitude. In the case of knowledge, however, it’s clear that the relevant class 
of reasons cannot be those that determine the truth of a belief. To hold that would be to identify the 
relevant class of reasons with truthmakers. This would improperly rule out knowledge by testimony, 
among other things. So, although moral worth consists in responsiveness to right-making reasons, and 
rationality consists in responsiveness to rationalizing reasons, it seems knowledge does not consist in 
responsiveness to truthmaking reasons.  
 Nor can the relevant class of reasons be evidential reasons, for evidential reasons do not 
necessarily bear any explanatory relation to the truth at all. Indeed, this is one diagnosis of what goes 
 
110 As Alex Worsnip has pointed out to me, however, there is a potential difference between knowledge and the other 
normative achievements I’ve discussed: unlike with moral worth and rationality, it seems clear that external luck can make 
the difference between knowledge and fully creditworthy (but false) belief. This is another wrinkle that a full account of 




wrong in Gettier cases. In such cases, one might think, the subject believes a true proposition for good 
evidential reasons, but those reasons are independent of the truth of the belief.111 This suggests that 
evidential reasons that bear no explanatory connection to the truth cannot be the relevant kind of 
reason for knowledge, because they fail to play one of the explanatory roles necessary for normative 
achievement. The relevant class of reasons must be more capacious than the class of truthmakers, but 
more restricted than the class of evidential reasons. A plausible middle ground, then, is that the 
relevant class of reasons is those evidential reasons that bear the right sort of explanatory connection 
to the truth of the proposition. This would rule out Gettier cases while still ruling in knowledge by 
testimony. Let us call such reasons alethic reasons.  
 Because alethic reasons are a larger class than just truthmakers, the explanatory relation 
between these reasons and the truth cannot be a relation of determination. Instead, as seems plausible 
in cases of testimony, the explanatory relation might in some instances go in the other direction. When 
one believes on the basis of testimony, it’s plausible that the truth of the proposition believed explains 
the normative force of the testimony, rather than the other way around. This is one way in which the 
structure of knowledge might differ from the structure of moral worth and rationality. However, I 
don’t think this should make us skeptical that knowledge is a normative achievement. The general 
structure of normative achievement, in which the very same normative reasons bear the two 
explanatory relations I have identified, is just as much present in knowledge as it is in moral worth 
and rationality. The following figure illustrates this:    
 
111 This is similar to what Zagzebski (1994) says about the independence of justification and truth being the locus of the 





If we think of knowledge as a normative achievement in this way, we have a model for analyzing 
knowledge as guidance by truth through correct responsiveness to alethic reasons.112 Such an analysis, 
I think, has the potential to solve a variety of problems in the theory of knowledge, including the 
Gettier problem.  
 The above is intended to give an example of how the framework of normative achievement 
can be extended beyond moral worth and rationality. Developing a full account of knowledge as a 
normative achievement would be one way to extend this framework. Moreover, there are myriad other 
normative achievements to which the framework could be extended. For example, since Aristotle, 
theories of virtue have distinguished between merely acting in accordance with virtue and acting from 
virtue.113 If virtue is the kind of normative standard that bears a relevant explanatory connection to 
 
112 Strictly speaking, the arrow from alethic reasons to the truth of p in Figure 4 is not unidirectional, because the direction 
of explanation can sometimes go the other way.   




normative reasons, then acting from virtue could be analyzed as a normative achievement. The scope 
of normative achievement, in short, is much broader than just moral worth and rationality. It covers 
any case in which normative reasons can play the two explanatory roles I have identified.  
 
4. The Centrality of Reasons Revisited 
 The structure of normative achievement is one in which normative reasons at once play two 
explanatory roles: one in justifying our actions and attitudes, and another in moving us to them. In 
Chapter 1, I suggested that normative reasons are unique in being able to play this role. This, I think, 
makes a strong case for the centrality of normative reasons in our theorizing. Normative reasons are 
central because they are indispensable to understanding the normative domain. Moreover, they role 
they play is arguably broader than the role played by other concepts that are seen as competitors for 
being the most central normative concept, such as ‘good’, or ‘ought.’ We cannot respond to evaluative 
or deontic properties as agents in some way that would be a competitor to respond to reasons. Like 
any properties, we can only respond to them through being moved by reasons involving those 
properties. What is good, and what I ought to do, can move us to action, thought, and feeling, but 
only when those facts figure into our motivating reasons.  
In other words, there is no other way of exercising our rational agency except by responding 
to considerations that we take to count in favor of our actions and attitudes. One thing that is unique 
about normative reasons is that they can be our motivating reasons (which is necessary but not 
sufficient for correctly responding to them). When they are, we respond to the very considerations 
that count in favor of our actions and attitudes. Only the concept of a reason has, and has essentially, 
both justificatory and deliberative aspects. The Rossian insight I discussed in Chapter 1 is that overall 
normative statuses are determined by the balance of competing considerations: normative reasons. 




various competing considerations and settling on an action or attitude on the basis of those 
considerations: motivating reasons. So, one way of putting the point is that normative and motivating 
reasons are two aspects of the concept of a reason, and when one correctly responds to normative 
reasons, those aspects come together. This is unique to the concept of a reason – there is no analogous 
distinction between motivating and normative values, or motivating and normative oughts.  
The fact that the category of normative achievement unifies not just moral worth and 
rationality, but arguably knowledge, as well as a variety of other properties, only strengthens the case 
for the centrality of reasons in normative theory. It does that partly by strengthening the case for the 
explanatory priority of reasons over a variety of other normative properties. It is already made plausible 
by the Rossian argument that moral reasons are explanatorily prior to moral rightness, because moral 
rightness is an overall status that does not seem to be subject to easy generalizations, but rather 
determined by the balance of competing considerations. This case becomes stronger when we 
recognize that moral worth consists in responding to these very considerations, in a way that mirrors 
how they determine the rightness of the action.  
The same is true of rationality. A broadly Rossian argument can be made that ex ante rationality 
is determined by the balance of competing considerations. Similarly, once we recognize that ex post 
rationality consists in responding to these very considerations, in a way that mirrors how they 
determine ex ante rationality, this strengthens the case for the priority of reasons. When we consider 
only the first explanatory role played by normative reasons, we have a broadly Rossian argument for 
the priority of reasons over certain overall normative statuses. But when we consider both roles at 
once, this provides a new argument for a broader priority of reasons, because reasons explain not just 
overall normative statuses, but the corresponding normative achievements. Thus, the broader 
application the category of normative achievements can be shown to have, the stronger the case is 




This project, then, has implications for what Errol Lord calls the “Reasons Program” in 
metaethics. The Reasons Program is a program of analyzing as much of the normative domain as 
possible using reasons as building blocks. What the framework of normative achievements shows 
about the centrality of reasons is congenial to the Reasons Program. However, it is important to 
distinguish theses about the centrality of reasons from theses about their fundamentality. Lord takes 
the main tenet of the Reasons Program to be Reasons Fundamentalism – the view that “we can 
provide real definitions of all of the complex normative properties in terms of normative reasons” 
(2018, p. 12). What I take myself to have established is something more modest, which is that reasons 
play a central and indispensable role in our normative theorizing, and the way in which they do so 
makes a strong case for their priority over a variety of other normative entities.  
This case seems particularly strong when it comes to deontic and hypological properties. But 
a central part of making the case for the fundamentality of reasons would be to make the case that 
they are also explanatorily prior to evaluative properties (what is known as the buck-passing account 
of value).114 This is not a case I have made here. Moreover, there is another kind of normative property 
that my brief discussion of knowledge suggests may be prior to reasons: correctness. If some 
normative reasons for attitudes like belief get their normative force from their connection to the 
correctness of those attitudes, then correctness may be prior to reasons. This is all to clarify that I am 
not claiming to have established the fundamentality of reasons in this dissertation. Rather, I take 
myself to established the more modest conclusion that reasons play a central and irreplaceable role in 
the normative domain.  
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